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Opportunistic Behavior and the
Law of Contracts
Timothy J. Muris*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of contract and commercial law focuses upon
whether a contract exists, the meaning of an agreement's
terms, and the consequences of a breach.' Besides addressing
these fundamental questions of formation, interpretation, and
remedy, courts often police an array of business actions under-
taken in performance of the contract. A major problem occurs
when a performing party behaves contrary to the other party's
understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to
the agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth
from the other party to the performer-a phenomenon that has
come to be known as opportunistic behavior.2 Because of the
wealth transfer, parties have an incentive to avoid becoming
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1. The most detailed and famous treatment of these areas of the law is
the multi-volume treatise A. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1962).
2. See 0. WzUAmsoN, MARKETS AND HIERARcmEs: ANALYSIS AND AT-
TRUST IMPUCATIONs (1975); Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair"
Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 356 (1980); Klein, Crawford & Al-
chian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Con-
tracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 97 (1978); Klein & Leffier, Market Enforcement
of Contracts: The Role of Price in Guaranteeing Quality, 00 J. PoL Econ. 000
(forthcoming); Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L & ECON. 233 (1979); Williamson, Wachter & Har-
ris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Ex-
change, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250 (1975).
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victims of opportunism, yet whatever strategy of self-protection
they choose, deterrence will be costly.3 Thus, for a given
amount of opportunism avoided, an individual will choose the
least costly method or combination of protective methods.
This Article examines how certain legal principles-im-
plicit terms of contracts--can be low-cost methods of deterring
opportunistic behavior. These legal principles or doctrines
have arisen when courts attempted to police contractual per-
formance with general concepts such as good faith4 and with a
variety of more specific doctrines that apply to particular types
of transactions. The general concepts remain ill-defined, how-
ever, and the foundation or purpose of the more particular doc-
trines appears uncertain. Although these doctrines are
traditionally viewed as diverse, this Article demonstrates that
many of them are unified by an underlying principle that pro-
vides a firmer basis for the doctrines than is normally given--
the deterrence of opportunism. The language of judicial deci-
sions varies, but many courts have acted to deter opportunism
and hence to decrease its costs.
Part H of this Article more precisely examines the nature
of opportunistic behavior and considers alternative solutions to
the opportunism problem, emphasizing the adoption of legal
principles that become implicit terms to a contract unless the
parties expressly stipulate otherwise. Part I surveys several
areas of contract and commercial law, in which the transaction
which provokes litigation involves possible opportunistic be-
havior. Because opportunistic behavior is clearly unlawful
when it is easily detectable, the analysis emphasizes behavior
that is ambiguous in character or that is difficult to detect even
after it occurs.
1I. OPPORTUNISM: ITS NATURE AND
ALTERNATIVE DETERRENTS
A. THE NATURE OF OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR
Two examples illustrate the opportunism problem. First,
consider a two-year contract in which a construction company
hires an architect for $3,000 a month.5 After the architect has
3. For example, parties could insist upon contractual clauses forbidding
specific opportunistic acts or they could painstakingly investigate the reliabil-
ity of each party with whom they plan to deal.
4. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
5. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844
(1891), suggests these facts.
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become thoroughly familiar with the details of the project, he
informs the construction company that the project will only be
finished for $4,000 per month. Putting aside for the moment
whether a court will enforce the increase, the construction
company will agree to the architect's demand if it cannot hire a
suitable replacement or take some other action, such as not
finishing the project, at less than $4,000. Because architects
may not be available on short notice or because of the original
architect's specialized knowledge of and relationship to the
project, the contractor may have to pay a new architect a larger
fee than $4,000 per month, especially if it takes the new person
time to "get up-to speed." Provided the construction company
cannot find a suitable replacement at $3,000 or less, the original
architect will be able to obtain a salary increase up to the dif-
ference between $3,000 and the next best substitute.
Consider also a successful fast-food franchisor. Its trade-
mark is a valuable commodity, representing to consumers a
specific standard of quality on such attributes as food, service,
and cleanliness. Maintaining the value of the trademark re-
quires franchisee expenditures on these attributes. If consum-
ers frequently patronize various franchises of the same
franchisor, an individual franchisee has the incentive to avoid
expenditures on quality because the franchisee will, at least for
a time, continue to attract consumers who expect and are will-
ing to pay for higher quality.6 The lower-quality franchisee will
benefit by the full amount of the savings from reducing quality
maintenance, but will lose only part of the cost. Thus, the
lower-quality outlet will benefit at the expense of the
franchisor, the higher-quality franchisees, and consumers.
These two examples suggest the conditions under which
opportunism occurs. To begin with, the problem occurs after
the contract is formed; it is not a problem of precontractual mo-
nopoly. The existence of a competitive market for architects
and franchisees prior to formation of the contract would not
necessarily have prevented the problem. Further, the victim of
the opportunistic behavior must place some value on the con-
tractual performance that the opportunist can appropriate. If
another architect were available post contract at $3,000 or if
consumers did not value the franchisor's trademark, no incen-
6. Theoretically, consumers need frequent only one franchise. If the fran-
chisee who reduces quality will receive a competitive rate of return in future
employment, he has an incentive to lower quality to obtain a higher than com-
petitive return even if the franchisee receives no repeat business.
1981]
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tive for opportunism would exist.7 Finally, the victim must
have failed to plan for the opportunistic behavior, perhaps
naively so. If the victim had done otherwise, the victim would
have avoided the problem so long as the costs of prevention
were less than the expected costs of the opportunism. 8
The architect and franchisee illustrations also reveal that
the threat of opportunism increases transaction costs because
potential opportunists and victims expend resources perpetrat-
ing and protecting against opportunism. For example, a
franchisor wary of opportunism may investigate prospective
francisees more carefully, make the franchise contract more de-
tailed, and engage in extensive monitoring. On the other hand,
the franchisee may expend resources to make the nature of the
cheating more difficult to detect. Resources spent to implement
or prevent opportunistic behavior do not help produce a com-
modity or service that the contracting parties mutually value.
Accordingly, the elimination or reduction of these expenditures
will improve the wealth of society by freeing the resources for
productive use.9 The challenge for the law is to help reduce
these costs without imposing still higher costs in the process.
This challenge is complicated because some forms of op-
portunism are more easily detected than others. If the archi-
tect knows that obvious opportunistic behavior will result in an
unenforceable modification, he or she may engage in more sub-
7. The value that creates the incentive to act opportunistically has been
characterized as an "appropriable quasi rent." See Klien, Crawford & Alchian,
supra note 2, at 298-302. For example, if the construction company needed to
pay $4,000 a month to replace the architect's services, there would be an appro-
priable value of $1,000. The appropriable value does not exist unless the spe-
cific identity of the contracting parties influences costs. This "economics of
idiosyncrasy" is discussed at length in Williamson, supra note 2, at 238-45, and
in Williamson, Wachter & Harris, supra note 2, at 251.
8. Even if potential victims frequently anticipate opportunism, thereby
reducing the amount of actual opportunism, a role for judicial prohibition of
such behavior still exists. See notes 16-21 infra and accompanying text. Al-
though guile has been discussed as a form of opportunistic behavior, see 0.
WILIAMSON, supra note 2, at 9, 26-30, whether or not such behavior has "moral"
overtones is relevant only to the extent that social mores against such behavior
will reduce the amount of it. The important point for this Article is that when
opportunistic behavior increases profits, people have an incentive to engage in
it.
9. For a discussion of these costly activities and their impact on society's
welfare, see Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense
or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351, 371-72; Landa, An Exchange Economy uith
Legally Binding Contract: A Public Choice Approach, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 905,
911-17 (1976). That social gains result from reducing expenditures aimed solely
at transferring wealth is now widely accepted in legal and in economic litera-
ture. See, e.g., Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra, at 370; Landa, supra, at 915-17.
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tle activities, such as claiming that unanticipated conditions on
the work site require more time and effort and hence justify a
higher fee. If the law enforces modifications for unanticipated
circumstances or for other reasons, distinguishing opportunis-
tic behavior from valid modifications may be difficult. Simi-
larly, the franchisee might reduce quality in ways that are
difficult to detect. For example, the franchisee could decrease
the monitoring of employees, thus discouraging the provision of
proper service, or could reduce the portions of food served be-
low the amounts that consumers have come to expect. Al-
though these activities are sometimes detectable, their
systematic detection may be costly. Moreover, although the
franchisor may think that the franchisee has violated a specific
clause designed to insure higher quality, if the franchisee has
been careful, litigation to prove a breach would be costly and
its result uncertain. This Article refers to such opportunism as
subtle opportunism. In general, opportunistic behavior is sub-
tle in two ways: first, the behavior is inherently difficult to de-
tect; second, although the activity is detectable, it is easily
masked as legitimate conduct, and thus its opportunistic nature
is discoverable only at a high cost.
Consideration of two other issues will facilitate the analy-
sis required to formulate principles against subtle opportu-
nism. First, the concepts of opportunism and breach should be
distinguished. Although opportunism provides a basis for con-
demning as a breach certain conduct that does not violate
explicit contractual language, not all breaches involve opportu-
nism. For example, one party may gain sufficiently from the
breach to compensate the nonbreacher for any losses and still
benefit. Without a wealth-transfer, no opportunism exists al-
though a breach still occurs. In addition, when exogeneous cir-
cumstances render performance within the terms of the
contract impossible, a breach exists, but opportunism does
not.'0 Nonperformance in such situations may harm both par-
ties as, for example, when they desire to complete the contract
but a government regulation forbids it. Further, when one
party has an honest but unreasonable understanding of the
performance it agreed to render, actual performance becomes a
breach. Here, the breach is a misunderstanding, not an attempt
to transfer wealth to the breaching party.
A second necessary distinction in forming legal principles
against opportunism involves the role of the wealth transfer
10. Of course, the law may excuse such a breach.
1981]
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from the victim to the opportunist. Any condemnation of op-
portunism based simply on this wealth transfer would first re-
quire that the victim be legally entitled to the wealth it loses.
Placement of the entitlement is, after all, the issue at hand.
The wealth transfer is significant not because of its mere exist-
ence, but because the transferring act itself does not produce a
beneficial product nor promote the productive goal of the con-
tract; yet both perpetrating and protecting against such a trans-
fer are costly. Returning to the architect example, the court's
decision to permit or to prohibit the modification clearly
changes the wealth of the parties; the architect's gain depends
upon the legal rule. Although the goal of the contract-in this
case, construction-will be fulfilled under either rule," both
parties will incur transaction costs if the contract is modified to
pay the higher price. Because there is merely a wealth transfer
that does not influence fulfillment of the contract's goal, the
courts can choose the legal rule that minimizes the parties'
costs of negotiating, performing under, and enforcing their con-
tract. Rules prohibiting opportunism are preferable to rules
permitting opportunism, therefore, if the former more effec-
tively reduce transaction costs. However, before concluding
what may seem obvious-that prohibiting opportunism reduces
its costs-the alternative efforts that potential victims may use
to deter opportunism must be carefully considered.
B. NON-CONTRACT LAw SOLUTIONS TO THE OPPORTUNISM
PROBLEM
The existing literature emphasizes four methods by which
potential victims can reduce, or even eliminate, opportunism.12
11. See note 9 supra and accompanying text; note 91 infra. For the sake of
illustration, the text ignores the possibility that the costs of opportunism can
be so high as to discourage some exchange of wealth. For a discussion of this
possibility, see note 19 infra and accompanying text. Even if exchanges are not
discouraged, opportunism could be condemned if it raises the costs of ex-
change. Thus the possibility of decreased exchanges strengthens the case
against opportunism.
12. No attempt will be made at a rigorous comparison of the utility of the
solutions discussed. For more rigorous comparisons of the noncontract law so-
lutions, see the sources cited in note 2 supra. Nevertheless, these sources pay
insufficient attention to the law's role in deterring opportunism. For example,
some authors are aware of the importance of detection costs, but nevertheless
ignore its relevance for deterrence through law. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian,
supra note 2, at 301, 309 & 320. Thus, they imply that even without changed cir-
cumstances an individual under a legally enforceable contract could success-
fully request and receive a higher price. Id. at 308. Williamson discusses how
parties choose different "governance structures" for their relationship. For ex-
ample, the architect's contract could leave dispute settlement to the govern-
[Vol. 65:521
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First, if good reputation has importance to the potential oppor-
tunist, the risk of a bad reputation may deter some acts of op-
portunism. For example, the architect may desire the future
business of construction companies that would learn of the un-
timely demand for a salary increase. Second, the potential vic-
tim may adjust the price to alleviate the cost of anticipated
opportunism or to deter its occurrence. Thus an employee who
is expected to cheat by shirking an average of one hour a day
can be paid a reduced wage to reflect the expected shirking.1
3
In the franchise example, the franchisor may allow the fran-
chisee to earn more than a competitive rate-of-return, giving
the franchisee more to risk from being caught at cheating than
from having a lower return. Third, in some cases, the potential
victim might avoid the risk of opportunism by choosing to own
the desired product, a practice known as vertical integration.
For instance, home owners may buy rather than lease land be-
neath their property to prevent landlords from increasing the
rent up to the cost of moving their homes elsewhere. Finally,
the parties can write a contract that precisely specifies the per-
formance to be rendered, such as a franchise contract that in-
cludes detailed specifications of quality, relying on the courts to
enforce the explicit provisions.
Each of these methods, however, will fail to deter opportu-
nism in some situations. For example, reputation provides lit-
tle deterrent when potential opportunists can conceal their
actions from those with whom they expect to contract. Vertical
integration is of limited value because it often costs more than
alternative forms of doing business, and because one cannot
own performance by humans in the sense that one can own
property such as the land in the home owner illustration. Thus,
even if the construction company in our first example had hired
the architect as an employee rather than as an independent
contractor, the architect might still command a higher wage be-
cause of the architect's special knowledge of the job. Fully ex-
plicit contracts, in which a court's role is only to enforce the
contract as written, are not feasible when the cost of discover-
ing and planning for all possible contingencies is prohibitive.
Further, breach of some terms will be difficult to detect and
ance structure of commercial and contract law or to a different structure such
as arbitration. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 246-54. Williamson does not,
however, discuss whether doctrines within the law can reduce the incentive to
behave opportunistically.
13. Because it is anticipated, the shirking that then occurs is not opportu-
nistic.
1981]
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even if detected, difficult to prove to an external observer such
as a court. This problem is especially serious with subtle op-
portunism.
Price adjustments also can fail to deter opportunism satis-
factorily. For example, even when an employer could hire
more employees at lower wages to solve the problem of shirk-
ing, a greater quantity of lower quality labor at a low price may
not perfectly substitute for a smaller quantity of more expen-
sive, higher quality labor. Thus, a firm may find that hiring ad-
ditional managers is not a reasonable solution to the problem
of managerial shirking.'4 Additionally, the "last-period" prob-
lem plagues both price reductions to compensate for opportu-
nism and price increases to deter opportunism. If the
relationship between the two parties has a known end point in
time (i.e., a last-period), then a price adjustment will not neces-
sarily prevent opportunism. If, for example, the architect's sal-
ary were reduced below $3,000, the architect could still
expropriate the difference between that salary and the price of
the construction company's next best alternative. In the
franchise case, even the franchisee who is receiving an above-
the-market return may reduce quality once he or she knows
the franchise relationship is about to end.
This last-period problem is particularly important for spe-
cific doctrines of contract law because many of the cases that
come before the courts involve relationships in which the par-
ties appear unlikely to contract with each other in the future.
Indeed, one would expect more litigation in last-period situa-
tions, particularly when the opportunist has a chance of win-
ning the case (as with subtle opportunism). Because litigation
will ordinarily decrease the probability of future business with
the victim, one who expects no future business is more likely to
risk the litigation that often accompanies opportunistic acts.15
14. In an extreme example of the failure of price adjustments to solve the
opportunism problem, a baker may lower quality by adding sawdust to the
flour. To at least some consumers, a greater quantity of bread with sawdust is
not a perfect substitute for less bread without, even if the lower quality bread
is much cheaper. Of course, even when price reductions are effective, potential
victims may use other measures to compliment the reduction. In the employee
situation, the employer may use some combination of monitoring workers and
adjusting wages based on anticipated output.
15. For a discussion of the last-period problem and its solutions, see Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2, at 304 n.17. One additional role for the law
concerns cases in which the price-increase solution creates a possibility of the
potential victim becoming a potential opportunist.
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C. CONTRACT LAW SOLUTIONS TO THE OPPORTUNISM PROBLEM
A fifth category of deterrents to opportunism involves de-
veloping legal principles that become implicit terms to any con-
tract unless the parties expressly stipulate otherwise. For
example, courts could determine that modifications obtained in
circumstances like the architect example are illegal unless the
original contract provided otherwise. If potential victims find
these implicit terms useful, they can sometimes avoid compli-
cated contractual language. In other words, implicit terms in-
crease reliance on relatively simple contracts. The usefulness
of implicit terms depends in part upon the ineffectiveness of
other methods of deterring opportunism. Nevertheless, even
when other methods of solving the opportunism problem are
unsatisfactory, the usefulness of implicit terms will be reduced
to the extent that reliance upon them requires a costly lawsuit
with uncertain results.
The effectiveness of implicit judicial terms will depend sig-
nificantly upon how precisely courts define rules for dealing
with opportunism. Courts could, for example, apply a general
rule that opportunism is unlawful, leaving the details of defin-
ing opportunism to a case-by-case approach. At the other ex-
treme, courts could attempt to deter opportunism through
precise rules geared to specific transactions, such as a rule that
enforces modifications only with new consideration.16 Costs
and benefits, both in the amount of opportunism deterred and
in costs to the parties and the courts, affect the attractiveness
of any approach. These costs and benefits have been dealt with
elsewhere, 17 however, and this Article will discuss them in de-
tail only as they apply to several specific legal doctrines.
Some general comments, however, will indicate the signifi-
cance of precision in rulemaking. Although greater precision
reduces costs, such as the litigation expenses of the parties,
precision also can deter some desired behavior while allowing
some undesired behavior. For example, rigid enforcement of
16. See notes 22, 36, 37 infra and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemak-
ing, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262-71 (1974). Precision can only be measured with
reference to the party addressed. Id. at 271. Thus, courts and parties may dif-
fer in their view of a rule's precision. For additional discussions of economic
aspects of the procedural system, see Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) (discussing
that the economic goal of the system is to minimize the sum of the costs of
making errors and the litigation costs of the parties and the courts); Schwartz &
Tullock, The Cost of the Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (1975) (clarifying the
costs of violations).
19811
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the consideration rule for modifications will prevent some mod-
ifications in which opportunism did not occur, but permit some
in which it did. Nonetheless, the less precise, case-by-case ap-
proach to rulemaking has an inherent, substantial disadvantage
when subtle opportunism is involved. Because of the nature of
subtle opportunism and of the judicial process, the trier of fact
will have great difficulty ascertaining the presence of opportu-
nism. Even when one expends resources to determine that he
was a victim, additional costs would arise to convince an exter-
nal observer such as a court, especially when the opportunist is
claiming otherwise. For example, a court may easily determine
that a modification in fact occurred, but, particularly if the op-
portunist has been careful, the court may have difficulty in de-
termining whether the modification was opportunistic.
Allowing both parties to present evidence without restriction is
costly and is not necessarily helpful in correctly deciding the
case, especially if the disagreement focuses on whose "word" is
more credible. To reduce this problem, rules could be devel-
oped to focus on the existence of objectively verifiable circum-
stances that act as surrogates for the existence of opportunism.
Although these surrogates need not be conclusive, they would
at least be useful in allocating burdens of proof.18
Because potential victims will insist on an adjustment in
the price or other terms of the contract to offset the costs of de-
terring opportunism, the value of judicial rules against opportu-
nism becomes clear. When the courts satisfactorily resolve the
precision problem to develop an implicit term that deters op-
portunism more cheaply than other methods, benefits to both
parties exist as of the time the contract is signed. 19 This is not
18. The development of objective surrogates only guides-not eliminates-
the role of the jury. Without objective surrogates, the jury's evaluation of sub-
jective intention would be costly without necessarily improving the quality of
decisions enough to justify the costs. For another treatment of the difficulties
facing the fact-finder, see generally R. DANZIG, THE CAPABuIxy PROBLEM IN
CONTRACT LAW (1978).
19. The most basic doctrine in the law of contracts provides a simple illus-
tration. For hundreds of years, English and American courts have allowed a
contract to create legally enforceable rights when parties have exchanged
promises of future performances. If parties could breach without legal conse-
quence, opportunistic behavior would be encouraged, but many voluntary ex-
changes of promises of future performance would continue. If parties could not
rely on the courts, they would instead rely on credit bureaus, bonding, experi-
ence gained from past dealings, and other such devices to reduce uncertainty
and to protect against the consequences of nonperformance. Such a system ap-
pears more costly than court enforcement of promises, however, because credit
bureaus and bonding increase the cost of contracts, including those that are
made by (at the least) increasing the number of agreements necesary to
[Vol. 65:521
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to say that potential victims will necessarily rely on contract
law more often than on other methods.20 Parties do often re-
solve disputes without resorting to courts or even to legal
rights,2 ' presumably because they find contract law more
costly, for the benefits received, than the nonlegal solutions
available. Nevertheless, assuming that parties choose the best
options available for deterring opportunism, knowledge of con-
tract law is crucial to understanding how parties respond to the
possibility of opportunistic behavior. In short, the law of con-
tracts affects people's ability to act opportunistically. How this
ability in turn affects contract law is the subject of the remain-
der of this Article.
achieve a given objective. Thus even though these contracts are made, it will
often be less costly to allow court enforcement of the original agreement.
Moreover, in some cases, these increased contractual costs would cause total
costs to outweigh the benefits of contracting, thereby decreasing the number of
exchanges. For further discussion of the problems without legal enforcement,
see R. PosNER, EcoNoMc AqALYsis OF LAW 66-67 (2d ed. 1977), and Landa,
supra note 9, at 911-16.
Deterring opportunism also explains why the relief for breach should in-
clude any wealth transfer between the parties as well as the extra resources
the non-breacher reasonably spends to find a substitute. For example, if B con-
tracts to buy goods from S for $10 and the market later drops to $8, a damage
award which includes the two dollar price differential discourages B from
breaching simply because he would gain two dollars from S at the expense to
both B and S of making a second contract.
20. Three additional points are relevant regarding the cost minimizing im-
pact of rules reducing opportunism. First, because parties do not pay all of the
costs of courtrooms, judges, and court employees, the possibility exists that po-
tential victims will rely too much on implicit terms. Because one reason for not
having parties pay all of these costs is that otherwise courts would create a
less-than-optimal amount of rules-such as those to deter opportunism-one
cannot conclude that this possibility in fact is a reality. See Landes & Posner,
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STuD. 235, 240-42 (1979). Second,
minimizing costs may also reduce benefits and thus require analysis of the net
effect. See generally notes 22-78, 145-56 infra and accompanying text. Finally,
rules avoiding opportunistic behavior comprise only a subset of cost-minimiz-
ing rules. See generally Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Noncon-
forming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach,
91 HARv. L. REV. 960 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 AN. Soc. REv. 55, 60-62 (1963). The existence of methods to de-
ter opportunism does not mean that opportunism will never occur. When the
potential victim is fully protected at the time the contract is formed, there will
not be opportunism. Full protection, however, is unlikely to be universal. For
example, the potential victim may have poorer knowledge of the methods of ap-
propriation than the other party. Even with use of deterrence methods such as
a higher price, this lack of knowledge will lead to the existence of opportunism.
See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2, at 305. In addition, uncertainty
may exist over whether courts will condemn certain behavior.
1981]
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TI. CONTRACT LAW AND SUBTLE
OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR
We begin with examples of easily detected acts in which
the existence of opportunism is difficult to determine: modifi-
cations, good faith in performance (which in turn is divided
into examples focusing on specific acts), and nonconforming
tenders. The discussion next turns to franchising, a problem
involving the subtle nature of the examples first discussed in
this section as well as opportunistic acts whose very existence
is difficult to detect. Finally, stipulated damage clauses are an-
alyzed; the major opportunism problem with respect to these
clauses concerns inability to detect the act at all. Besides sub-
tlety, these examples share three distinct characteristics. First,
they involve problems of behavior after contract formation.
Second, important parts of the law usually applied to these ex-
amples have generally been regarded as troublesome or even
incomprehensible. Finally, the law will be seen to have a here-
tofore unperceived coherence: in effect, courts imply a term to
deter opportunism.
A. MODIFICATIONS
Hundreds of appellate court cases have involved a modifi-
cation that has increased the duties of one party under the con-
tract without increasing that party's rights. Our architect
example illustrates this recurring pattern: the company must
pay a higher price to the architect, but the architect promises
to do only what previously had been promised. For this reason,
in the jargon of contract law, these modifications are said to
lack consideration.2 2 Understanding the subtle nature of these
modifications is important to distinguishing opportunistic from
nonopportunistic modifications in principle and in practice.
1. Subtlety
As seen in the architect hypothetical, modification cases
can involve opportunistic behavior. Common examples include
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (l)-(2) (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1973) provides: "(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for. (2) A performance or return promise is bar-
gained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise."
Most of the examples in this Article involve possible extortion by the per-
forming, as opposed to the paying, party. This is for convenience only; both
parties can extort if conditions such as those discussed in text accompanying
notes 5-9 supra exist.
[Vol. 65:521
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the extortionist, who will not perform without more favorable
terms, and the debtor who will repay only at a lower price,
often manufacturing a "dispute" to justify the difference.23 Be-
cause many modifications are beneficial, however, we could not
simply bar all of those that lack consideration. For example,
circumstances sometimes change from those the parties
thought existed when they signed the original contract. A lead-
ing case, Watkins & Son v. Carrig,24 involved a contract to ex-
cavate a cellar. Soon after excavation started, the excavator hit
solid rock, and the parties then agreed that the excavator
would receive a nine-fold price increase.2 5 Several reasons un-
related to opportunism may explain why the owner of the prop-
erty agreed to pay a higher price. For instance, the owner
might gain a reputation for fair dealing, avoid driving the exca-
vator into bankruptcy, prevent the excavator from giving
poorer-than-normal performance, or feel enhanced self-esteem
from acting altruistically.26 Thus, both the owner and the exca-
23. See J. WH=TE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 46-48 (2d ed.
1980). The best discussion of the case law of modifications, at least as of the
early 1960's, is 1 A. CoRBNn, supra note 1, at §§ 171-192. For a good discussion of
more recent cases, particularly under the Uniform Commercial Code, see Hill-
man, Policing Contract Modification Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doc-
trine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 862-76 (1979). For leading case
examples of extortion, see Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th
Cir. 1902) (owing to remoteness of place and shortness of season, fishermen
who stopped work were promised additional compensation to finish job of
catching and canning salmon); Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N.W. 511
(1881) (plaintiff in need of money accepted $4,000 on a take-it-or-sue-me basis
from the defendant who owed at least $4,260); Lingenfelder v. Wainwright
Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891) (an architect engaged in building a
brewery, who stopped work because a contract for a refrigerating plant had
been awarded to business rival, was promised a commission of five percent of
the cost of the refrigerating plant as inducement to resume work). For cases
involving modifications of loan agreements in which a creditor who appeared to
be in a precarious position allowed the debtor to request and receive more
favorable terms than under the original contract, see Havighurst, Considera-
tions, Ethics and Administration, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 28 n.76 (1942).
24. 91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941).
25. Id. at 460, 21 A.2d at 591.
26. Acting to prevent a poor quality performance is itself an effort to avoid
a type of opportunism. On the other motivations for accepting a modification
without new consideration, see Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and
Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,421-25 (1977). As Posner suggests, Goebel v. Linn, 47
Mich. 495, 11 N.W. 284 (1882), was arguably a good example of attempting to
prevent a company from going broke. Posner, supra at 421. In Goebel, an ice
company agreed to supply all of the ice required by a brewer for not more than
two dollars a ton. Part way through the contract, the ice company informed the
brewer that, because the ice "crop" had failed the previous winter, it would no
longer ship ice at the contract price. The parties then agreed to a modification
at $3.50 per ton. Professor Dalzell, however, contends that there is no evidence
to support the argument that keeping the ice company in business explained
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vator benefit from the modified price. As another example, a
merchant with a note due for $6,000 may value $5,000 received
today much more than $6,000 at a later date because of an op-
portunity to invest the money at a high return. Accordingly,
the merchant may be willing to accept $5,000 as a complete dis-
charge if the debtor is financially troubled and cannot pay the
$6,000 when due.27
Thus, the mere existence of a modification does not estab-
lish whether it was mutually beneficial or extorted. Because
only some modifications are extorted, they present a source of
subtle opportunistic behavior. If one assumes that neither ex-
torted nor mutually beneficial modifications are empirically
trivial in litigated cases, a per se rule toward modifications is
inappropriate.28 Instead, distinguishing extorted from mutually
beneficial modifications becomes crucial. If no distinction can
be found and applied, at least some parties can be expected to
rely on more costly methods to protect themselves, such as
drafting detailed clauses to cover otherwise unanticipated cir-
cumstances.
2. Opportunistic or Mutually Beneficial Modifications:
Distinguishing in Principle
In principle, the distinction between opportunistic and
nonopportunistic modifications lies in the promisor's reasons
for agreeing to the modification. If A agrees to a modification
with B only to avoid the costs of suing B, the modification
merely transfers wealth from A to B at the expense both of en-
tering into the agreement and of expending the effort to avoid
becoming a victim. In other words, the modification is opportu-
the modification. See Dalzell, Duress By Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C. L. REv.
237, 264 (1942). The court found that a gratuitous motivation explained the
modification in Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68 (1873) (creditor gave valid gift to
debtor of unpaid balance of account). The Depression-era cases in which land-
lords decreased rent may be examples of owners attempting to maintain their
good reputation assuming that the landlords wanted their tenants to continue
renting after the termination of their lease. Given the precarious financial posi-
tion of many of the tenants, landlords may also have benefitted by helping to
keep the tenants from bankruptcy. See, e.g., Liebreich v. Tyler State Bank &
Trust Co., 100 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). But see Levine v. Blumenthal,
117 N.J.L. 23, 186 A. 457 (1936) (refusing to enforce reduced rental agreement).
27. See Ebert v. Johns, 206 Pa. 395, 397, 55 A. 1064, 1064 (1903).
28. This is true unless the costs of using the judicial system dictate other-
wise. The question of whether or not most litigated modifications are either ex-
torted or mutually beneficial is ultimately an empirical one. See text
accompanying note 52 infra. But in the appellate cases in which one can deter-
mine the reason for the modification, both types appear to be frequent See
notes 23, 26 supra.
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nistic or extorted. Even though A would win a suit for breach
of the original contract, A may need immediate performance to
avoid serious financial problems. Moreover, the lawsuit may
not fully compensate any loss because the victim cannot re-
cover the direct cost of litigation, including attorney's fees, and
because some damages occasionally cannot be obtained.29
Having agreed to the extortion, the promisor presumably
preferred the modification to then-existing alternatives. Ac-
cordingly, nonenforcement of the modification could lead to the
promisee's breach, and thus to potential harm to the promisor.
A rule deterring extorted modifications would prevent such
harm if it "enforced" the modification without giving the prom-
isee the extorted advantage, leaving the promisor with the per-
formance agreed to under the terms of the original contract.
This approach creates a problem, however. If promisees know
that they cannot gain through modifications, they will prefer
breach to performance of the original contract when the bene-
fits of breach exceed the costs. One such case occurs when the
promisee is judgment-proof and the promisor agrees to the
modification to keep the promisee in business. This modifica-
tion is mutually beneficial. If, on the other hand, the promisor
is faced with a judgment-proof promisee desiring to work else-
where, the promisor may turn to other legal solutions, such as
tort damages for inducing breach of contract against the party
with whom the promisee deals, specific performance of the
original contract, or an injunction to restrain the promisee from
working elsewhere.
29. For example, the doctrines of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854), and of certainty limit the ability of the promisor to be fully compen-
sated. These limitations increase the promisor's costs and thus increase the
amount that the promisee can extort.
This Article addresses the role of the pre-existing duty rule in deterring op-
portunism. Common law rules of damages and awards of litigation expenses
are accepted as given. A complimentary strategy, beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, would be to modify those other rules. Even if those doctrines were im-
proved, however, there would still be a residual category of cases in which the
damage remedy is not fully compensatory, creating a value for promisees to ap-
propriate. For example, under the certainty doctrine, there would be cases in
which the benefit gained by measuring damages more accurately would not be
worth the cost.
When the parties settle an honestly disputed claim, the settlement con-
tains consideration and is not a modification as that term is used in this Article.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76B (Tent. Draft No. 1-7,
1973). If all settlements were enforced, some could be extorted by one party
simply asserting an invalid claim and stating "sue me if you do not like my
terms." The requirement of an honest dispute, however, appears to prevent
this form of opportunism. See id.
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Of course, promisees could still extort from their promisors
the lesser of the costs of a lawsuit or the price of alternative
performance. An anti-extortion rule does not prevent promis-
ees from extorting this amount or from breaching and attempt-
ig to "bluff" promisors from undertaking lawsuits. A rule does
prevent promisees from extracting larger gains at the expense
of the promisor, as when some of the promisor's damages are
noncompensable and the promisee could otherwise extort the
amount of these damages in addition to the litigation expenses.
Reducing these larger potential gains' reduces the resources
used to engage in and deter opportunism. 30
Distinguishing in principle between modifications raises
other complications. Even when a modification has been mutu-
ally beneficial, possible extortion cannot be ignored. For exam-
ple, a party's discovery that he or she can make a better deal
elsewhere is one reason for a modification that is not necessar-
ily mutually beneficial. In Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch,
Inc.,31 a company agreed to pay a designer $90 a week. Two
months after the original contract began, the designer was of-
fered $115 elsewhere. The original company and the designer
then agreed on $100 a week, and the court enforced the modifi-
cation.32 Although the modification may have been mutually
beneficial-for example, the company may have wanted to es-
tablish a reputation among its employees for fair dealing or
have wanted to keep them happy to avoid poor performance-
one cannot preclude extortion simply because someone else of-
fered the designer more than the contract price.33 The modifi-
30. Two other strategic consequences of the pre-existing duty rule deserve
mention. First, when the gains to the promisee from breach exceed the gains
from extorting only the litigation costs, the pre-existing duty rule will give the
promisee an incentive to breach when the promisor desires performance. See
text accompanying note 29 supra. Second, because suing after performance is
received avoids the problem of noncompensable damages, promisors have an
incentive to avoid litigation until the promisee performs under the modification.
Of course, promisees would only expose themselves to litigation when there
was uncertainty about the law or facts.
31. 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
32. Id. at 205, 131 N.E. at 890. As is often noted, the stated reason for the
result-that the parties agreed to rescind the original contract before entering
the modification-is faulty, given that the rescission and the signing of the new
contract occurred simultaneously. See, e.g., 1 S. WMUSTON, CONTRACTS 179-80
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1957).
There were discrepancies between the designer's and the company's ver-
sions of the facts. The designer stated that the new offer was for $110 and that
the company initiated the modification. The company argued that it had no
choice but to offer more money given the unavailability of substitute perform-
ance. 231 N.Y. at 199-200, 131 N.E. at 888.
33. Posner argues that
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cation transferred $10 a week to the designer; if the designer
had breached the original contract, he would have had to com-
pensate the company for the damage.34 Thus, the company was
worse off under the modification relative to the original con-
tract.35
Moreover, that the modification provided less money than
the second offer does not demonstrate that extortion was ab-
sent. At the time of modification, the promisee may have felt
that the promisor would not sue if the promisee kept the in-
crease to $10 a week. Alternatively, the promisor may have sus-
pected that the promisee preferred the original job at $100
because of nonpecuniary benefits. Under this assumption, the
promisor, depending upon his or her bargaining skills, could
have limited the amount extorted. Thus, although Schwartz-
reich may have been correctly decided, extortion was possible
even given a second offer higher than both the price of the orig-
inal contract and of the modification.
3. Distinguishing in Practice: The Present State of the Law
Given the subtle nature of opportunistic modifications, it is
not surprising that only some modifications are enforced. The
common law refuses to enforce modifications that fall within
the pre-existing duty rule. In its simplest form this rule states
that when a party agrees to do only what it had already prom-
ised, there is no consideration, and the modification is invalid.36
Although the rule could be applied to bar all modifications not
supported by consideration, it has never been so rigidly inter-
preted. Many modifications without consideration have been
[b]ecause the higher price is a genuine opportunity cost of continued
compliance with the contract, the promisor should be allowed to termi-
nate subject only to his obligation to make good the promisee's loss
from the breach, and hence he should be allowed to negotiate with the
promisee over a modification that will compensate the promisor for lost
opportunity.
Posner, supra note 26, at 424. Nevertheless, although the parties should be al-
lowed to negotiate, the presence of the lost opportunity does not necessarily
negate the possibility of extortion.
34. If the company would have had to pay a substitute designer $115, the
damage would be $25 per week plus the costs of locating the substitute.
35. Because the first contract gave the first company designing services at
$90, the opportunity that the designer lost by not first agreeing with the second
company represents a gain to the original company. Rewarding the designer
solely for his lost opportunity harms the original company. Moreover, avoiding
the expenses of a lawsuit would not have justified the modification. See text
accompanying note 29 supra.
36. For good summaries, see A. Colmm, supra note 1, § 175; S. WILLISTON,
supra note 32, § 130, at 443-45.
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enforced, particularly when unanticipated circumstances arose
that made the change appear mutually beneficial, as in the cel-
ler excavation case.37
Whether or not they enforce the modification, few courts
discuss the underlying factual and policy issue, namely,
whether the modification was extorted. Many scholars and a
few judges, however, have explicitly recognized this as the cru-
cial issue,38 and their arguments have triumphed both in the
Second Restatement of Contracts and in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Although section 76A of the Second Restatement re-
tains the pre-existing duty rule, section 89D(a) states that
modifications are valid if "fair and equitable in view of circum-
stances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
37. On the cases enforcing modifications, see 1 A. CoRBIN, supra note 1,
§ 175 n.16. On cases involving unanticipated circumstances, see id. § 184; An-
not., 85 A.L.R.3d 259 (1978). Of course, if the unanticipated circumstances were
such as to discharge the duty, the likelihood of extortion would greatly de-
crease. The cases reveal, however, that the circumstances do not have to be so
severe. See A. CoRBIN, supra note 1, § 184. See also Annot., 12 A.L.RL2d 78
(1950) (indicating that cases enforcing modifications on the now repudiated
recission theory, see note 32 supra, often involve unanticipated circumstances).
Concerning the meaning of unanticipated, Comment b to the Second Restate-
ment section 89D states:
The reason for modification must rest in circumstances not "antici-
pated" as part of the context in which the contract was made, but a
frustrating event may be unanticipated .. . if it was not adequately
covered, even though it was foreseen as a remote possibility.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1-7,
1973) (emphasis added). Although the question is not free of doubt, it appears
that the parties need to have allocated the risk for the circumstances within the
course of their negotiations before the circumstances are "anticipated."
Because one can almost always point to some unanticipated event, it is im-
portant to emphasize that the new circumstances must be linked to the reason
that makes the modification mutually beneficial. For example, in Barnwell &
Hays, Inc. v. Sloan, 564 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1977), a cotton farmer agreed to sell all
cotton grown on 200 acres during 1973. Part way through the year, his cotton
gin was destroyed and the buyer then agreed to accept only 12 more bales in
full satisfaction of the farmer's duty. From these facts it could be argued that
the unforeseen circumstances of the destruction of the gin greatly increased
the seller's cost of performing beyond the 12 bales and that the buyer benefited
from enhancing a reputation for fair dealing or perhaps from helping keep the
farmer in business. The farmer, however, proceeded to sell over 60 bales to
others at a much higher price than the original contract. Assuming that the
original buyer was unaware of the other bales, it appears that the foundation
for concluding that the buyer benefited-the seller could not (except perhaps
at great cost) furnish more than 12 bales-did not exist. Thus, the modification
does not appear properly linked to the unanticipated circumstance. The court
nevertheless enforced the modification, id. at 256, illustrating the tendency of
courts to ignore the extortion issue under the Uniform Commerical Code. See
text accompanying note 46 infra.
38. For scholarly criticism, see, e.g., 1 A. ComiN, supra note 1, § 183, at 148-
49; G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACTS 22-28, 76-77 (1974).
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made."39
Reeker v. Gustafson4O illustrates the tendency of common
law courts not only to prevent opportunistic modifications, but
also to improve in their analysis of such problems. In Reeker,
the original contract provided for the sale of 155 acres for
$290,000. Approximately three weeks after the contract was
formed, the sellers' attorney informed the buyers that the sell-
ers "were willing to go to court to get out of the [original]
agreement and that litigation was expensive,"41 whereupon the
buyers agreed to the sellers' suggestion to raise the price to
$300,000. In the buyers' suit for specific performance of the
original contract, the trial court ruled that the modification was
valid. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, despite precedent in
Iowa that arguably supported enforcement of such modifica-
tions on the faulty logic that the parties had rescinded the first
contract at the same time as the modification. 42 The Reeker
court rejected this theory. The court's discussion of the Second
Restatement, however, suggested approval of the results, but
not the reasoning, of prior cases that had applied the recission
theory-particularly a trio of cases decided between 1946 and
1955, in which the Reeker court noted the presence of unantici-
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1-7
(1973). Section 89D(c) allows enforcement based upon reasonable reliance.
Section 76A, Comment a, recognizes extortion as the explicit basis for enforce-
ment. For a recent illustration of the Second Restatement approach, specifically
adopting section 89D(a) in an unanticipated circumstances case, see Angel v.
Murray, 113 R.I. 482, 493, 322 A.2d 630, 636 (1974). For other favorable discus-
sions of section 89D, see Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 176 Conn. 162,
169, 405 A.2d 72, 76 (1978); Gintzler v. Melnick, 116 N.L 566, 569-70, 364 A.2d 637,
640 (1976). Section 348 of the Second Restatement also retains the oft-criticized
rule of Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884), holding that modifications for
payments of debts need new consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACTS § 348 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1978).
In contrast to the Second Restatement, the Restatement in section 76(a),
adopted the pre-existing duty rule without stating the policy basis and without
a section such as 89D. Professor Williston, the reporter of the Restatement, de-
fended the pre-existing duty rule as "consistent" with other principles of con-
sideration. S. WniLSTON, supra note 32, at 420. A few courts, however, have
found that the Restatement incorporates the unanticipated circumstances test.
See, e.g., Lange v. United States, 120 F.2d 886, 890 (4th Cir. 1941); Evergreen
Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 M.D. 610, 616, 112 A.2d 901, 903 (1955) (citing
Lange as authority). These courts mistakenly relied on Illustration 8 to section
76 which would only enforce the modification if the new circumstances excused
the promisee's duty to perform under the original contract.
40. 279 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1979).
41. Id. at 747.
42. This theory has a long history, including use in Schwartzreich v.
Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 197, 205, 131 N.E. 887, 890 (1921). S'ee notes 31-35
supra and accompanying text.
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pated circumstances.43
In contrast to the common law, the Uniform Commercial
43. Recker v. Gustafson, 279 N.W.2d 744, 755-59 (1979). The Recker court
also found section 89D inapplicable to the facts before it, see 279 N.W.2d at 758-
59, and although the court did not explicitly approve the results of the earlier
cases, it did discuss the Second Restatement favorably. Indeed, simply because
the court felt it necessary to discuss the applicability of the Second Restate-
ment, indicates some judicial recognition of the persuasiveness of the Second
Restatement position. Nevertheless, Professor Hillman criticizes Recker as
clinging to the pre-existing duty doctrine in a way that will cause the law of
contract modification in Iowa to remain confusing and unpredictable. See Hill-
man, Contract Modification in Iowa-Recker v. Gustafson and the Resurrection
of the Preexisting Duty Doctrine, 65 IowA L REv. 343, 355-62 (1980). Although
Hillman seems to be criticizing the court for mechanical application of the pre-
existing duty rule, he does note that the court "intimated that it might follow
the Second Restatement approach in the future when unanticipated circum-
stances have led to the modification." Id. at 356 n.83. He raises two problems
with this result. First, even if Iowa adopted the Second Restatement, "after
Recker Iowa courts apparently would enforce unfair or inequitable modifica-
tions if additional consideration flowing to the promisor could be found. At
least there is nothing in the opinion that suggests such modifications would not
be enforceable." Id. Because the court was not faced with the issue of addi-
tional consideration, it is difficult to see the basis for this contention. If the
court had stated that it would focus solely on the issue of new consideration,
Hillman's fears would be justified, but the discussion of the Second Restate-
ment provides evidence that the Iowa courts will not so act.
Second, Hillman is critical of the Second Restatement position itself. In
part, he fears that "unanticipated" has no clear meaning. Id. at 357. Although
no mechanical test exists, the concept is capable of use and understanding.
See note 37 supra. Hillnan also argues that the Second Restatement would
preclude enforcement of modifications that are voluntarily made but not the re-
sult of unanticipated circumstances. Hillman, supra, at 357. For example, he
suggests that if the Recker evidence revealed that the buyers voluntarily
agreed to the $10,000 price increase because they believed they had struck a
very good deal and wanted to maintain good relations with the sellers, then the
modification should be enforced. The deal could have appeared to be good at
the time of the contract or only at some subsequent period. If it was a good
deal subsequently for unanticipated reasons, the modification would be en-
forceable under the Second Restatement. Hillman is correct as to a favorable
deal at the time of the contract. Nevertheless, if the buyers knew that they
were taking advantage of the sellers at the time of the contract yet wanted to
maintain good relations with them, it is not clear why they would not have of-
fered to pay a higher sum in the original contract. Moreover, given that the
buyers would now be claiming extortion, in the absence of unanticipated cir-
cumstances proof of mutual benefit would be very difficult, leading to higher
costs with no certainty of improving the decision. If there are no unanticipated
circumstances, it is difficult to see why there is mutual benefit. As Hillman
himself admits, "people do not often voluntarily give up something for noth-
ing." Id. at 358. Finally, even under the Second Restatement rule, the buyers
would not be prevented from maintaining good relations with the sellers by, for
example, a gift of $10,000 or even entering into a valid recision of the contract,
and at some later date agreeing to pay $300,000. In contrast to Recker, other re-
cent cases still mechanically apply the pre-existing duty rule in cases in which
the modification was probably a product of extortion. See, e.g., Engle v.
Shapert Construction, 443 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (contractor at-
tempt to modify contract held unenforceable).
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Code explicitly repeals the pre-existing duty rule.44 The com-
ments to section 2-209, however, reveal that modifications must
meet the test of "good faith."4s Rather than employ this "good
faith" requirement as a method of policing extortion, many
Code cases have ignored good faith entirely or have given it
only perfunctory attention. 46 Thus, in practice, the Code ap-
pears to have worked a result quite different from that of the
common law. The Code has failed to provide a mechanism to
prevent extorted modifications.
4. Distinguishing in Practice: The Approach Implicit in the
Common Law
In all of the criticism of the pre-existing duty rule, one is-
sue-an issue that would be important even if the Code did
control extortion-has received scant attention.47 The issue is
how courts should distinguish between illegal and legal modifi-
cations made without consideration, given that a per se rule is
inappropriate.46 An understanding of the different approaches
44. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
45. U.C.C. § 2-209(1), Comment 2 states:
The effective use of bad faith to escape performance on the original
contract terms is barred, and the extortion of a "modification" without
legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of
good faith. Nor can a mere technical consideration support a modifica-
tion made in bad faith.
The test of "good faith" between merchants or as against
merchants includes "observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade," [Section 2-103], and may in some situa-
tions require an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modifi-
cation.
46. See Hillman, supra note 23, at 862-76. See also notes 61-65 infra and ac-
companying text
47. To some extent, Hillman, supra note 23, is an exception, although this
Article disagrees with some of his fundamental concepts. See text accompany.
ing notes 73-76 infra.
Posner presents an economic approach to modifications, emphasizing the
manner in which the promisor might benefit, and also briefly discussing how
courts should prevent enforcement of modifications in "monopoly" situations
such as Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). See Pos-
ner, supra note 26, at 423-24. This Article differs from Posner's approach by an-
alyzing both the transaction cost aspects of opportunistic behavior (extortion in
this case) and the evidentiary problems of an optimal rule regarding modifica-
tions. A "monopoly" analysis such as Posner's does not capture as well as does
an opportunism analysis the problems in the cases to which the pre-existing
duty rule applies. For example, when a debtor extorts a poor creditor, the
problem is not that the debtor has an ability to reduce output in the usual
sense of a monopolist, but rather that, given the creditor's circumstances, a
lawsuit is unattractive. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. Moreover,
the problem is clearly not one of precontractual monopoly. See text accompa-
nying note 7 supra.
48. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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taken by the common law and by the UCC helps explain the
poor performance of courts under the Code.
One problem in distinguishing opportunism from mutually
beneficial behavior involves allocating the burden of persua-
sion.49 The burden influences the nature of the trial and the
verdict that is reached when the jury cannot otherwise decide
whether the modification was extorted. An important issue in
allocating the burden concerns the percentage of all modifica-
tions that are extorted. If most modifications were mutually
beneficial, the burden would best be placed on the party oppos-
ing the modification, because cases decided on the basis of this
allocation would involve fewer mistakes than would be likely
with the opposite allocation.5 0 Yet ascertaining the proportion
of modifications that are mutually beneficial is quite difficult.
Many scholars seem implicitly to assume that most modifica-
tions are valid, even those without consideration.5 1 Further, in
cases involving continuous dealings, parties face a cost from
extorting or from reneging on a modification, such that modifi-
cations in this context seem more likely to be valid. Neverthe-
less, the validity of most litigated modifications cannot be
assumed.52 Even if most modifications are valid, most of those
actually litigated may not be; litigated cases are not necessarily
a representative sample of all modifications. In addition, al-
though continuous dealings may provide a disincentive to ex-
tort, the fact of litigation indicates that the opportunist does not
value the goodwill that usually exists during continuous deal-
ings. Ultimately, determining what percentage of litigated mod-
ifications is extorted is an empirical question for which no
evidence currently exists.
Even if we knew the percentage of extorted modifications
49. The "burden of persuasion" falls upon the party who will lose on that
issue unless the evidence is sufficiently in his favor to meet a given "standard
of proof," which in civil cases is usually "more likely than not." See McCoR-
MICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336, at 784, § 338, at 794 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972).
50. Thus, if nine out of ten litigated modifications are valid, placing the
burden on the party favoring validity will cause a mistake in ninety percent of
the cases that are decided solely on the basis of the allocation of the burden of
persuasion. The allocation of the burden will influence the type of cases that
are litigated, complicating the analysis by requiring knowledge of the total
modifications likely to be litigated under alternative assumptions.
51. See, e.g., J. DAwsON, GiFTs AND PROMISES 208-11 (1980).
52. If we knew that finding validity when the clause was invalid caused
greater costs than finding invalidity when the clause was in fact valid, this fact
would influence our calculus. There appears to be no basis, however, to distin-
guish between the costs of the two types of error. See Posner, supra note 17, at
408.
[Vol. 65:521
OPPORTUNISM
so as to allocate the burden of persuasion, courts would still
face the difficult problem of detecting extortion in individual
cases. Resolution of the extortion issue requires an inquiry
into whether the modification was mutually beneficial. Be-
cause the promisor to the modification, who has received the
"short end" of the deal relative to the first contract, will claim
extortion in any litigated case, the fact-finder will face conflict-
ing testimony. If a jury attempts to determine directly whether
the promisor benefited, it may be forced into a decision based
solely on whose "word" is more credible-a subjective and
treacherous task.
The modern common law, as implied in the principles of
the Second Restatement, has in effect reduced this evidentiary
problem by taking a predominantly indirect approach to assess-
ing promisor benefit. Under section 89D(a), any enforceable
modification requires "an objectively demonstrable reason for
seeking" it.53 The usual method for meeting this requirement
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D, Comment b (Tent. Draft
No. 1-7, 1973). The modification must be "fair and equitable" in light of the un-
anticipated circumstances. See text accompanying note 39 supra. Although the
comments to section 89D do not greatly elaborate on the meaning of "fair and
equitable," it appears consistent with the requirement, see note 37 supra and
accompanying text, that the unanticipated circumstances must be linked to the
reason why the modification is mutually beneficial. Further, the "fair and equi-
table" requirement implies that even with unanticipated circumstances, the
promise may have still been extorted. See text accompanying notes 68-70 infra.
Although this Article does not agree with Restatement sections 76A and
89D(a) in all of their particulars, it does accept them as generally correct state-
ments of the modern common law. Reliance on the Restatements in this man-
ner is not justified as to all sections. See, e.g., note 93 infra; Clarkson, Miller &
Muris, supra note 9, at 354, 381 n.82 & 382-83. Reliance is justified as to sections
76A and 89D(a) because the two central tenants of those sections--that the
pre-existing duty rule exists to deter extortion and that unforeseen circum-
stances are the touchstone for enforcement of modification--are consistent
with the majority of common law cases, as revealed by the cases cited here and
by the substantial amount of commentary analyzing those cases. See notes 23-
26 supra and the sources and cases cited in the Reporter's Notes to sections
76A and 89D. This Article does not agree with sections 76A and 89D(a) in all of
their particulars, however. For example, the sections do not discuss at all the
evidentiary justification for the rules as considered infra and Illustration 3 ac-
cepts the result in Schwartzreich without mentioning the possibility of ex-
torting.
This is not to deny that the refusal of courts to discuss explicitly the extor-
tion issue has led to confusion and occasional decisions inconsistent with the
theory proposed here. Some cases enforcing modifications do so without ex-
plicitly discussing lack of extortion or the existence of unforeseen circum-
stances and in so doing do not reveal sufficient facts on these issues to
determine whether the decision was correct. Other cases mechanically apply
the pre-existing duty rule, searching for any trivial difference to call a new con-
sideration, without giving sufficient facts to determine whether the modification
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involves showing unanticipated circumstances. From such cir-
cumstances a court can infer mutual benefit, because the prom-
isor has arguably benefited, if at all, because of them. For
example, the promisee may have encountered unexpected ob-
stacles, be near bankruptcy, or present some similar fact from
which a court can conclude that the promisor has gained from
agreeing to the modification even though no new rights are re-
ceived. The existence or absence of these unanticipated cir-
cumstances will normally be objectively verifiable, and will not
depend solely on the credibility of the respective parties.54
Occasionally, cases involving mutually beneficial modifica-
tions will present difficult evidentiary problems or, perhaps,
even be denied enforcement. For example, returning to an em-
ployee case such as Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc. ,55 the
employer may grant a modification when the employee finds
his or her immediate supervisor unexpectedly harsh. Even if
the employer has this nonextortive reason for increasing the
employee's pay, if in the context of litigation the employer
changes its mind, the employee's claim of "harshness" presents
potentially greater complications than the claim in the con-
struction case of "I hit stone," since "harshness" is a more sub-
jective concept. Nevertheless, the employee can still rely on
objective circumstances such as a change in supervisors, a
change in other work conditions, or specific events as testified
to by fellow employees. 56
was probably extorted. In any event, given that the parties rarely use litigation
to settle their disputes, see generally Macauley, supra note 21, and that parties
will only litigate when there is some disagreement over the facts or the law, see
Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L & ECON. 61, 91 (1971), pre-
sumably only "close" cases are litigated. Thus it should not be surprising to
find some cases that conflict with others.
Finally, comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-209, quoted in note 45 supra, could have,
but has not, formed the basis for interpreting the Code similar to the Second
Restatement.
54. Analytically, the promisee would have to show both the occurrence of
some circumstance and that the circumstance was unanticipated. On the na-
ture of "unanticipated," see note 37 supra.
55. 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921). See notes 31-35 supra and accompany-
ing text.
56. Besides an inquiry into whether the circumstances that have changed
were anticipated, it is possible that opportunism was anticipated. Returning to
our architect example, assume that the architect is valued at $3,000 and that the
litigation to avoid an extorted modification cost $1,000. Opportunism and its
consequences can be avoided by a salary of $2,000, assuming no quality
problems, see text accompanying note 14 supra, no information problems in de-
termining the correct discount, and no problem of uncompensatory damages. If
the architect attempts to hold out for an additional amount greater than $1,000,
he or she can then profitably be sued. In practice, to avoid forcing the court to
make the precise determinations of value, a promisee's claim that the price was
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At least one other objectively verifiable method exists to
demonstrate that the promisor benefited, namely, assessing the
alternatives available to the promisor at the time of the modifi-
cation. Because the modification imposes a new cost upon the
promisor relative to the original contract, the issue is whether
an alternative was available at less cost than the modification.
If so, the promisor presumably chose the modification because
its benefit exceeded the higher cost, and the modification
should therefore be considered mutually beneficial.5 7 For ex-
ample, if the architect in our earlier example receives a modifi-
cation to $4,000 per month and the construction company could
have found a substitute of equal quality for less (including the
costs of search and negotiation), the modification appears mu-
tually beneficial. The reasonableness of the alternatives ap-
pears to be recognized in the common law of modifications. 58
Of course, this "reasonable alternative" device probably
has somewhat limited application in the modification context.
As alternatives to the modification, the promisor can either sue
the promisee or seek substitute performance. Litigation will
often be more costly than the modification, given the ability of
the promisee to increase the promisor's expenses and the fail-
ure of the law to provide for compensation of litigation ex-
penses and for certain types of damages. Were litigation to
compensate the promisor fully and thus be equal in value to
adjusted to account for opportunism should be limited to more obvious exam-
ples.
In general, the argument that because parties will anticipate opportunism
if it is legal, rules against opportunism are unnecesary, ignores the potential
differences in costs between different rules. See notes 5-21 supra and accompa-
nying text; notes 175-77 infra and accompanying text.
57. Promisors who claim that they were nevertheless coerced or who were
unreasonably ignorant about the alternative should still have their modifica-
tions enforced since enforcement will motivate such promisors to protect their
own interests when court supervision is unnecessary for that protection.
58. In providing case examples of whether modifications are enforceable,
the Second Restatement § 89D, illustrations 2 and 5, imply the existence or non-
existence of possible lower-cost substitutes as a relevant criterion. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTnACTs § 89D (Tent. Draft No. 1-7, 1973). It should
be noted that in illustration 2, based upon Lange v. United States, 120 F.2d 886
(4th Cir. 1941), the modification was enforced when alternatives were all
higher-priced. Unforeseen circumstances existed, however, and the promisee
agreed to perform at zero (accounting) profit, thus reducing the likelihood that
the modification was extorted. In addition, alternatives are important in the
law of duress which is related to the problem discussed here. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 316-317 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977). One prob-
lem with the Second Restatement treatment of reasonable alternatives in the
duress context may exist-insensitivity to the inadequacies of the legal proc-
ess. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317, Comment b, Illustrations
1-7 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977).
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performance of the first contract, any modifications entered
into would then be necessarily more attractive than the original
contract. The market alternative may appear more attractive,
but its attractiveness is limited by the costs of finding substi-
tute performance, including the costs of the substitute being in-
ferior. Because the promisor would only be reimbursed for
such costs upon successfully suing the promisee-and even
then some costs might not be reimbursed as incapable of cer-
tain estimation-these costs provide a basis for promisee extor-
tion. Nevertheless, the presence of a less-costly legal or market
alternative, with cost including search and other damage costs,
is an objectively verifiable circumstance from which to infer a
mutually beneficial modification.
Insistence on objective circumstances reduces the number
of trials that will turn upon more subjective evidence, such as
the jury's attempt to determine promisor benefit directly. If the
promisee-the party favoring the modification--cannot show
objective reasons for change, the pre-existing duty rule will ap-
ply. The focus on objective circumstances eliminates the costs
of directly determining promisor benefit, at least in the absence
of unanticipated events. The focus also reduces uncertainty,
further lowering costs. 59 Although the commentators and cases
are silent on the issue, the common law approach thus appears
to allocate the burden of persuasion to the party favoring the
modification.60 The burden can be met either by showing a
lower-cost alternative that the promisor rejected or by showing
unanticipated circumstances from which one can conclude that
the modification was mutually beneficial.
Contrasting this interpretation of the common law with the
UCC position reveals some of the advantages of the former.
For example, in Pirrone v. Monarch Winz Co.,61 the evidence
was insufficient to meet the promisee's common law burden of
59. For a recent example of a court shortening the trial, see Mobile Turn-
key Hous., Inc. v. Ceafco, Inc., 294 Ala. 707, 713, 321 So.2d 186, 191 (1975) (explic-
itly recognizing that extortion was the crucial issue, the court refused to
enforce a modification when circumstances were anticipated, thus precluding
difficult issues in future cases of similar circumstances, including determina-
tion. of whether a modification even existed or was of mutual benefit).
60. An additional reason for allocating the burden of producing evidence to
the prominsee is that the promisee should usually have more knowledge of the
unanticipated circumstances because those circumstances relate to the prom-
isee's reason for nonperformance.
61. 497 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974). For a more detailed discussion, see Hillman,
supra note 23, at 863-66.
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persuasion, but because UCC standards were applied,62 the
court enforced an apparently extorted modification. Pirrone, a
winemaker, agreed to sell to Monarch, America's largest pur-
chaser of peach brandy, 150,000 gallons in 1968 and again in
1969. Apparently because it had overbought brandy and be-
cause the market price fell to two-thirds of the contract price,
Monarch unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a quantity re-
duction and then breached the shipping schedule. In 1969, with
Pirrone complaining of financial difficulty, its facilities loaded
with brandy, its production of the more profitable wine limited,
and its ability to ship in Monarch's control because of the ne-
cessity for Monarch to initiate a shipping permit, the parties
agreed to a modification terminating Pirrone's rights for the
1969 sale. Although Pirrone received damages for breaches oc-
curring before the modification, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed a jury award of lost profits for the 1969
sale.63 The court noted that the modification did not need con-
sideration, and briefly dismissed Pirrone's claim of duress.64
The result would have been different if the court had applied
the burden of persuasion rule suggested above. Given the ap-
parent absence both of unanticipated circumstances that could
have led to a mutually beneficial modification and of any lower-
cost alternative for Pirrone, the modification would not have
been enforced, thereby preventing extortion.6 5
If the promisee did meet the burden of persuasion as pro-
posed above, what result would follow? The existence of a low-
cost alternative would render the modification valid6 6 -prom-
62. Many courts have refused to police modifications for extortion despite
the Code's good faith test. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
63. 497 F.2d at 29.
64. Id.
65. Because Pirrone formally initiated the discussions that led to the modi-
fication actually adopted, Monarch might argue that it should not have the bur-
den of persuasion. Further, Monarch might argue that Pirrone had waived its
1969 claim since Pirrone did not reassert it until the suit. On the facts as stated
in the opinion, neither argument should prevail. Given the circumstances,
Monarch's action motivated Pirrone to making the best out of a bad situation
and an additional request for the 1969 performance would have been useless.
See Hillman, supra note 23, at 865-66.
This Article's discussion of the Code argues that the current problem has
been the refusal of courts to consider the extortion problem, not that the UCC
solution is necessarily incorrect. Under the Code, the promisor could be allo-
cated the burden of persuasion, meeting it by showing the absence of unfore-
seen circumstances. This solution raises a problem to the extent that showing
the absence of unforseen circumstances is more difficult than showing their
presence, but it is preferable to the current performance of courts interpreting
the Code.
66. Relevant evidence will include a promisor argument that some (per-
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isor rejection of a lower-cost alternative indicates that the mod-
ification was not extorted. On the other hand, if the promisee
met this burden by showing unanticipated circumstances, the
modern common law would allow the promisor to rebut the re-
sulting inference of mutual benefit from the modification. 67 For
example, the promisor could attempt to show that the modifica-
tion was accepted only when the promisee was able but unwill-
ing to continue without it, thereby rebutting the "unanticipated
circumstances" claim. Allowing promisor rebuttal is defensi-
ble, although it will increase litigation costs and may cause the
case to be decided upon subjective evidence such as the jury's
direct evaluation of whether the promisor benefited. Because
the promisor could have benefited does not in itself mean that
the modification was accepted for this reason. For example, in
Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc.,68 although the promis-
see-designer might have successfully argued both that the sec-
ond job offer was unanticipated at the time of the original
contract 69 and that the promisor benefited, for example by an
enhanced reputation for fair dealing, the promisor still might
have agreed only because the market and litigation alternatives
were less preferable. Apparently because of this possibility,
even if a jury finds that the promisee has met the burden re-
garding unanticipated circumstances, the effect of the common
law position is to force the jury to decide whether the prom-
isor's rebuttal evidence indicates extortion.7 0
haps subjective) aspect of the promisee's performance made the promisee a
lower-cost alternative than others even though another person in the prom-
isor's position might have considered the promisee a higher-cost alternative.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op CoNTRAcTs § 89D, Comment b (Tent.
Draft No. 1-7, 1973).
68. 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921). See notes 31-35, 55-56 supra and ac-
companying text.
69. Depending upon the nature of the original contract and of the second
offer, the promisor might successfully argue that the second offer was antici-
pated and the risk of such an offer was allocated to the promisee in the original
contract. For a recent case illustrating how a contingency that increases the
burdens of performing was anticipated, see Mobile Turnkey Hous., Inc. v.
Ceafco, Inc., 294 Ala. 707, 321 So.2d 186 (1975) (adverse subsoil conditions are
not an unanticipated circumstance when a contract unambiguously provided
for this contingency). For an earlier example, see Hoskins v. Powder Land, 90
Ore. 217, 176 P. 124 (1918) (promisee claimed that he was forced to haul earth
farther than originally supposed but he had stipulated his personal knowledge
of conditions on the work-site).
70. For an example of the promisor winning in such a case, see Rexita
Constr. Co. v. Midwest Mower Corp., 267 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App. 1954) (Despite
possible unforeseen circumstances, the promisor complied only after finding no
other alternatives and stopped complying with the modification as soon as it
found a substitute at a price less than the modification. The modification was
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Because the factual circumstances will vary widely from
case to case, only the most general guidance can be offered re-
garding the standards a jury should apply when the promisor
attempts to rebut the inference of mutual benefit that is raised
by the promisee's showing of unanticipated circumstances. In-
structing the jury to focus on the promisor's motive is more a
conclusion than a guide, given the difficulty of determining mo-
tivation directly. Some facts are, however, relevant to an indi-
rect determination. For example, the promisor's response to
the proposed modification can be important. A jury may view
willing acquiesence to the modification as more damning than
promisor protest, absent indications that protest would have
been useless. Evidence of the promisee's ability to perform
will also be relevant-a showing that the promisee was close to
bankruptcy would be especially strong evidence in favor of the
promisee. There occasionally may even be evidence, such as a
"hot" document, revealing that the promisee was fully able and
willing, if necessary, to perform.7 ' In evaluating the evidence,
the jury can also examine the strength of the inference raised
by the claim of unanticipated circumstances. The closer these
circumstances come to excusing the duty of the promisee
under the original promise, the stronger the inference of mu-
tual benefit will appear, all else being equal.7 2 Due to the ab-
sence of judicial discussion of these issues in relevant cases, it
is unclear exactly how a fact finder will use these facts in prac-
tice. Nevertheless, explicit attention to these issues should im-
prove handling of them, given the judicial experience that will
accrue over time. In any event, cases of genuine doubt, which
undoubtedly will occur, will be resolved in favor of the prom-
not enforced, although the court's reasoning, but not result, was inconsistent
with opportunism analysis.)
Of course, this is not to argue that the jury is limited to questions of extor-
tion when determining the enforceability of a modification; for example, the
statute of frauds or reasonable reliance may also be relevant.
71. Analytically, perhaps this point of promisee bluffing should be dealt
with in terms of whether the circumstances were linked to the reason for not
performing. See note 37 supra. Thus, even after the promisee presents evi-
dence of unanticipated circumstances, rather than trying to rebut the inference
these circumstances raise, the promisor may argue that the inference should
not be raised in the first place.
72. This point follows because the closer the circumstances come to excus-
ing the promisee's duty under the original contract, the harder it is for the
promisee to perform, all else equal. The more difficult performance is for the
promisee, the more likely is damage to the promisee-promisor relationship if
the promisor does not agree to the modification. Thus, the closer the unantici-
pated circumstances are to excusing the original promise, the more the prom-
isor has to gain from the modification.
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
isee, because the promisee's showing of unanticipated circum-
stances places the burden of persuasion on the promisor to
present an adequate rebuttal.
The focus on unanticipated circumstances has at least one
more important practical consequence. When such circum-
stances exist, the promisor has an added incentive to resist ex-
tortion because an unprotesting agreement to the modification
may cause the jury to find for the promisee. Promoting such
promisor resistance adds another cost to a rule that allows the
promisor to rebut the inference of mutual benefit from unantic-
ipated circumstances. Perhaps, however, this cost is justified
because more effective protests would decrease the number of
extorted modifications that courts ultimately enforce, and
hence decrease the incentive to extort. Thus, benefits exist to
offset the costs of promisor resistance, although again the rela-
tive magnitudes of the costs and benefits are uncertain.
The effect of the modern pre-existing duty rule reflects an
approach to modifications that this Article has developed and
analyzed. This approach varies from the law of duress, since
absent new consideration, the common law appears to allocate
the burden of persuasion to the party favoring the modification,
the promisee, even if the increased cost to the promisor relative
to the original contract is slight. Only gross disparities in the
benefits exchanged raise an inference of possible duress.7 3 Be-
cause of this feature of the law of duress, one commentator has
recently suggested that the promisor must incur substantial ex-
tra costs from the modification before the promisee should
have to show that the modification was not extorted.74 Thus,
the question arises whether thedifference in approach between
the law of modification and that of duress is justified, since
both might be used against "extorted" modifications.
Implied in the principle that courts should not question the
73. See Hillman, supra note 23, at 880-88. "Unfair surprise" or "unconscio-
nability" (as used in Epstein, Uncoscionability: A Critical Reappriasal, 18 J.
I & ECON. 293, 301-05 (1975)) are alternative concepts for "duress" in this con-
text.
Historically, duress was rarely used to void modifications, see Dalzell,
supra note 21, at 255-76, and a modification obtained by a threat to breach a
contract was not considered duress. See id.; RESTATEMNT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 492-493 (1932). More recently, however, duress has been defined to include
threats when no reasonable alternative exits. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRAcTs §§ 317-318 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977).
74. See Hillman, supra note 23, at 885-88. Hillman would determine
whether the deviation was substantial by looking to the criteria that courts use
to distinguish material from immaterial breaches. Id at 887-88.
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adequacy of consideration7 5 is the concept that value is subjec-
tive. Only the parties to an agreement can know for certain the
precise values that they place on the promises exchanged.
Thus, if the law of duress is to respect this subjectivity, it must
insist upon "gross" disparities of exchanged values. With a
modification, however, the parties have already revealed impor-
tant information about their subjective valuations through the
terms of the first contract. Given this knowledge, any deviation
that seems to benefit only one party, such as occurs in a modifi-
cation without consideration, raises an inference of possible ex-
tortion.
This distinction does not preclude justification of the devia-
tion from the original terms, such as by showing unanticipated
circumstances, nor does it prevent the normal duress rule from
applying when the modification has new consideration. More-
over, the difference between duress and modification law does
not mean that shifting the burden of persuasion, even following
modifications that vary slightly from the original terms, will
cause promisors to pursue worthless claims. If the minor varia-
tion causes no harm to the promisor-for example, the buyer
agrees that the seller can deliver one week late when the delay
will not harm the buyer-the promisor-buyer has no incentive
to challenge the modification because a court would not award
damages.7 6
To summarize, the possibility of opportunistic behavior has
been shown to justify some restriction on contractual freedom.
Not all modifications should be enforced, with the reason for
modification determining enforceability. Because some reasons
are difficult to determine, rules should be developed to facili-
tate distinguishing extortive from mutually beneficial reasons.
The modern common law appears to reduce transaction costs
by allowing at least some contracting parties to rely upon an
implicit legal term against extorted modifications without
resorting to more costly methods of protection. The common
law's focus on new consideration' and unanticipated circum-
75. See, e.g., 1 A. ComI, supra note 1, § 127.
76. The lesser the deviation, the lesser are the promisor's damages and the
less likely the promisor will be to litigate.
77. Because parties receive new benefits in a modification with new con-
sideration, courts can safely assume, with the assumption being rebuttable,
that the exchange is not extorted. There must be more than a pretense of con-
sideration, however, and hence promisees cannot use sham transactions to
avoid the burden of persuasion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 76A, Comment c (Tent Draft No. 1-7, 1973).
It has also been frequently suggested that a modification should be pre-
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stances has a beneficial effect in allocating the burden of per-
suasion. Indeed, the modern common law position as
interpreted here performs well in deterring opportunism. 78
B. GOOD FArrH IN PERFORmANCE
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that "[e]very con-
tract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement."79 Although the Code offers
no better definition of good faith than "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade,"80 the term pervades the Code's law of sales: thir-
teen provisions in Article 2 explicitly use "good faith," while
twenty others have comments containing the term.81 Moreover,
although the decisions vary from one jurisdiction to another,
common law courts have deemed good faith relevant at every
sumed valid in cases in which a third party, C, promises to pay A if A will per-
form his or her contract with B. See, e.g., 1 A. CoRBIN, supra note 1, § 176; S.
WILLISTON, supra note 32, §§ 131, 131A RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(d)
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76A, Comment d (Tent. Draft
No. 1-7, 1973). The primary argument for this position appears to be that there
is no harm in these promises since third parties cannot be extorted. See, e.g., 1
A. CoRBN, supra note 1, at 125. This argument, however, ignores that there
may well be external benefits to C from the A-B contract and that C may be
willing to pay to receive those benefits. With such benefits, the incentive for
opportunistic behavior exists. A particularly graphic example involves a third
party who promises to obtain benefits as a family member. See, e.g., Hale v.
Brewster, 81 N.M. 342, 467 P.2d 8 (1970) (relative of indigent client promised
lawyer money to prosecute appeal on behalf of client who lawyer represented
at trial); De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917) (father prom-
ised benefits to prospective son-in-law contingent upon marriage).
Thus, if the validity of third party promises can be presumed, new consid-
eration would appear to furnish a basis. If A breaches, A would be liable in
damages to both B and C, with this increased liability representing the prom-
isee's consideration for the promise. (Of course, a separate problem concerns
whether C can prove damages, a problem that C can alleviate with a stipulated
damage clause.) Enforcing the third party contract has the added benefit of
making A face the true costs that a breach would cause. Again, extortion can
be shown to rebut the inference of validity.
78. The common law position deters opportunism unless, of course, one
can assume that most litigated modifications are valid or that the costs of the
promisor's rebuttal of the inference of benefit drawn from unanticipated cir-
cumstances exceed the benefits of such rebuttal.
79. U.C.C. § 1-203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Tent.
Draft No. 1-7 1973). This section discusses the general concept of good faith in
performance of the contract, suggesting some parameters to this vaguely de-
fined concept. Except for stipulated damages, the other examples discussed in
this part are sometimes said to involve the concept of good faith. See notes 93-
137 infra and accompanying text.
80. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b).
81. See Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. I REv. 195, 212, 219 n.91 (1968).
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stage of the contracting process, from negotiation through rem-
edy. This Article will not survey the broad field of good faith,
but instead will analyze several recurring issues of good faith
in the performance of contracts: prevention of performance,
quantity variations in requirements and output contracts, per-
centage leases, bad faith interpretation, and '%villful" substan-
tial performance. These issues are not discussed in all of their
detail, but they are considered in sufficient depth to demon-
strate that reliance on good faith is a common response to op-
portunistic behavior, thus infusing the good faith concept with
more unity than has commonly been acknowledged.82 Finally,
the deterrence of opportunistic behavior will be shown to pro-
vide a firmer, more rigorous basis for condemning bad faith
than other approaches.
1. Prevention of Performance
It has long been settled that when one party prevents or
hinders the performance of another, the nonhindering party's
duty to perform is excused: such conduct can even constitute a
breach of contract.8a How to determine whether one party's
"hindering" act is sufficient to invoke the doctrine, however, re-
mains unsettled. Words such as fairness, justice, and good
faith provide at best only tenuous guides. Moreover, if the pre-
vention doctrine is of uncertain usefulness, parties may rely on
other devices to protect themselves, such as adding clauses to
the contract detailing permissible and impermissible behavior.
The principles underlying the condemnation of opportunis-
tic behavior provide a surer guide. Consider the well-known
cases of Patterson v. Meyerhofer84 and Iron Trade Products Co.
v. Wilkoff Co.85 In Patterson, the plaintiff had agreed to sell
four specifically identified houses to Meyerhofer for $23,000. Al-
though Patterson did not own the houses at the time of the
82. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 81, at 199-207. This Article does not
claim to explain completely all individual uses of "good faith," or even to ex-
plain all uses of good faith with a foundation in costs or other economic consid-
erations. For example, the doctrine of mitigation of damages is often seen as
one of good faith, see, e.g., F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CoNTRAcrs 976-90 (1970),
and can perhaps be explained as encouraging the shift of resources to their
highest valued uses.
83. See 3A A. ConmN, supra note 1, §§ 767-771; 6 A. CoRn, supra note 1,
§§ 1264, 1323; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 295, 315 (1932); RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 231, 269 (Tent Draft No. 1-7 1973).
84. 204 N.Y. 96, 97 N.E. 472 (1912). The facts of Patterson are taken from
the majority opinion. A three-judge dissent viewed the facts differently than
did the four-judge majority. See 204 N.Y. at 102-07, 97 N.E. at 473-75.
85. 272 Pa. 172, 116 A. 150 (1922).
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contract, both parties understood that he planned to purchase
them at a foreclosure sale and that he hoped to make a profit
by paying less than $23,000. Meyerhofer appeared at the fore-
closure sale and bid against Patterson. In every instance of a
Patterson bid, Meyerhofer bid higher, with Meyerhofer's suc-
cessful bid totaling $22,350. In Iron Trade the parties had
agreed to the sale and purchase of 2,600 tons of rails. Circum-
stances indicated that the buyer desired to buy as many rails
as possible and that the 2,600 tons represented only part of its
planned purchases. Apparently, rails were available in quanti-
ties large enough to fill the contract in only two locations-one
in Georgia and another in West Virginia. When the seller
under the contract was negotiating to purchase rails to fulfill
the contract, the buyer announced its urgent desire to purchase
rails, then bought 887 tons and agreed to purchase a much
larger quantity from the suppliers with whom the seller had
been negotiating, thus reducing the available supply of rails
and raising their price. The seller did not deliver any of the
2,600 tons of rails.
In both cases the seller under the contract was forced to
compete with its own buyer in purchasing the commodity that
was the subject of their bargain, and in both the seller chose
not to match the buyer's competition. Nevertheless, in Patter-
son, the buyer's conduct was held to be impermissible, 86 while
in Iron Trade, the court found the conduct permissible. 87 How
can these cases be reconciled? They cannot be distinguished
on the basis that there was prevention in Patterson and only
hindrance in Iron Trade. In both cases, the seller could have
outbid the buyer. Nor did explicit wording in the Iron Trade
contract permit the buyer's behavior and thus distinguish the
cases.88 The distinction suggested in the Second Restatement-
86. 204 N.Y. at 101, 97 N.E. at 473.
87. 272 Pa. at 176-77, 116 A. at 151.
88. Although some commentators imply that the cases are indistinguish-
able, others argue that the cases can be distinguished on the basis that in Iron
Trade the seller assumed the risk of competition from the buyer. See, e.g., RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 295, 315 (1932); Patterson, Constructive Conditions
in Contracts, 42 COLUun. T_ REv. 903, 937 (1942). This argument, however, does
not explain how an assumption of risk can be found in some cases when the
contract is silent on the issue, but not in others. This problem is made more
acute because those who argue for the risk distinction also argue that individu-
als do not assume the risk that their performance will be prevented. See, e.g.,
Patterson, supra, at 935. This is not to say that the parties cannot allocate the
risk on custom or on an explicit term if they so choose. See text accompanying
note 92 infra.
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that the buyer in Iron Trade was not malicious 8 9-- does not
seem useful either. This test requires knowledge of the buyer's
subjective intentions. Further, a buyer who had originally in-
tended to buy elsewhere would know, or should know, that
such a practice would make the seller's performance more diffi-
cult. There is no reason to condemn the buyer for this alone,
yet determining what additional facts constitute "malicious-
ness" would be extremely difficult in practice.
The analysis of opportunism presented in this Article, how-
ever, offers a principled distinction. In Patterson, given the
contract, the buyer had already made provision for the
purchase of the four houses.90 Thus, the buyer's behavior ap-
peared to have the sole function of transferring wealth from the
seller (who lost his expectation) to the buyer.91 On the other
hand, in Iron Trade, it appeared that the buyer desired the
2,600 rails specified in the contract in addition to those that it
purchased in competition with its contracting party. Thus, the
competition in Iron Trade was not merely to avoid paying the
contract price. in Patterson, once the original contract existed,
the buyer's conduct not only wasted the resources spent on the
conduct, but, if permitted, would also have wasted resources
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 262, Illustrations 6 & 7
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973). For a similar approach to the prevention problem ap-
plied in a much different context, see McDermott, Defining Manipulation in
Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze," 74 Nw. U.L REv. 202, 215-
19 (1979).
90. There is nothing in the Patterson facts indicating that, absent
Meyerhofer's acts, Patterson would have failed to purchase the houses at the
auction. If Patterson would have failed to do so, however, Meyerhofer's actions
would have been justified. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 295
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975); id. § 315 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977).
In Iron Trade the court specifically noted that the seller did not allege that
the supply of rails was "limited." 272 Pa. at 174-75, 116 A. at 150. Although sup-
plies of all items are in some sense limited, the court's statement appears to
refer to the absence of a claim that the available supply of rails was only
enough to fill the first contract or that the buyer's additional purchases reduced
the remaining supply below 2,600 tons.
91. Throughout this discussion of good faith in performance, opportunistic
conduct is defined as conduct whose sole effect is to transfer wealth. The prob-
lem with the wealth transfer is not that the party losing wealth (the seller in
Patterson) has an initial right to the wealth. See text accompanying note 11
supra. Instead, the problem is that the difference between a rule permitting
the opportunistic act and one prohibiting it is one of the parties' wealth, not
one of whether the buyer ends up with the houses. Because the buyer ends up
with the houses in either case, the rule that lowers the cost of exchange is pref-
erable. Prohibiting the buyer's behavior when its only result is to transfer
wealth discourages such behavior and accordingly reduces the amount of re-
sources spent on it and protecting against it. See generally notes 5-21 supra
and accompanying text.
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that future sellers could have spent to avoid such conduct, for
example, by negotiating contractual clauses to prevent it.
Of course, parties in a Patterson situation should be al-
lowed to agree that the buyer could bid against the seller. Al-
though such agreement seems unlikely, one can envision
contracts permitting such competition. For example, owners of
a house who desire to sell may hire a broker while retaining
the privilege of selling on their own.92 But, if the parties do not
want to bargain for such a privilege, using opportunism to
guide application of an implicit prevention term facilitates use
of simple contract terms.
2. Quantity Variations in Requirements and Output
Contracts
Requirements contracts, by which buyers agree to buy all
they need from one source, and output contracts, by which sell-
ers agree to sell all they produce to one source, do not specify
the precise quantity to be transferred. Such contracts provide
obvious mutual benefits, including the flexibility of not specify-
ing quantity until information unavailable at the time the con-
tract is formed comes into existence. The question of breach
often arises when a quantity tendered or ordered varies signifi-
cantly from past quantities, or when performance has recently
begun and the tender or order varies from the pre-contract re-
quirement or output. Both the common law and the U.C.C. at-
tempt to control variations by permitting only those made in
good faith.93 This analysis focuses on variations in require-
ments, by far the most common issue in the litigated cases, and
demonstrates that despite the complexity of the issues under-
lying a good faith/bad faith distinction, sensitivity to opportu-
nism provides a principled basis for distinguishing good from
bad faith.9
92. See, e.g., 3A A. CoRmN, supra note 1, § 768.
93. See Weistart, Requirements and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations
Under the UCC, 1973 DUKE L. REV. 599, 600. See also J. WH=rr & IL SUMMERS,
supra note 23, at 121-27.
Williamson argues that quantity variations in contracts with idosyncratic
aspects are unlikely to be opportunistic because those aspects imply significant
costs to the opportunists from switching. See Williamson, Transaction Cost Ec-
onomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L & ECON. 233, 251
(1979). This Article contends that opportunism is still possible even with rela-
tively low costs of switching. Moreover, it also suggests that opportunism can
occur with products much less specialized than those that Williamson analyzes.
94. Output contracts involve similar issues. For a brief discussion of some
of the differences between output and requirements contracts, see note 114 in-
fra.
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The case of a requirements buyer reducing purchases pro-
vides an initial illustration of the potential for opportunistic be-
havior. Opportunism can occur when the requirements
contract price exceeds the market price, giving the buyer the
incentive to avoid the contract when the costs of avoidance are
less than the gain from paying a lower price. The contract-mar-
ket price difference determines the amount that the buyer can
profitably spend to avoid purchasing the requirements under
the contract. In addition to these costs, the buyer's action may
cause the seller to incur costs in selling elsewhere that the
seller otherwise would not have incurred. Moreover, the seller
may take steps to avoid similar action by buyers in the future,
such as by adding additional contractual detail. Unless either
the contract explicitly permits the buyer's conduct or such per-
mission is implied in the agreement by custom or by some
other standard process of implication, 95 the buyer should be
prohibited from diverting his or her purchases, thereby elimi-
nating the costs that such diversion causes.
A relatively easy case involves buyers who, in an attempt
to satisfy their needs elsewhere, deny that they have require-
ments. In Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp,9 6 for example, the
buyer agreed to purchase its needs of certain oil products for
two years. Before the contract expired, the buyer formed a
new corporation with one of the seller's competitiors. The
buyer was the corporation's manager and the competitor was
the supplier of oil products to the new corporation. The court
rejected the buyer's argument that the change in corporate
form left it with no requirements and instead found the buyer
to have acted in bad faith.97 Forming the new corporation was
costly. If its formation benefited the buyer only by lowering the
price of the oil products, the diversion merely shifted wealth
95. The explicit terms can distinguish opportunism from a losing contract.
For example, when the buyer sells too cheaply, the contract explicitly sanctions
the seller's request for delivery and thus opportunism is not present. For a
case approving an increase in requirements partly on the ground of custom, see
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 431-37 (SD. Fla. 1975)
(Although the buyer purchased in excess of his needs, seller knew of the prac-
tice and never complained until the market price rose sharply. The opinion
gave no indication that buyer manipulation had increased with the price rise.)
96. 245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957).
97. Id. at 637. For a case similar in facts and result to Western Oil, see
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Cox, 207 Va. 197, 203.06, 148 S.E.2d 756, 761-63 (1966)
(buyer still in fact had requirements, although court argued buyer liable be-
cause of an implied promise to have requirements). See also Texas Indus., Inc.
v. Brown, 218 F.2d 510, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1955) (decrease not sanctioned when re-
quirements buyer of an input for manufacturing plants leased plants to others,
claiming that lease ended duty to buy).
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from the original seller at the expense of the costs that both
parties incurred.
Another example of possible opportunism involves the
owner of several plants who agrees to buy all inputs for a par-
ticular plant from one seller but, part way through the contract,
closes or significantly curtails this plant and fills the orders that
the seller under contract would have supplied from a more dis-
tant seller. If the plant curtailment and subsequent reduced re-
quirements were prompted by input prices for the other seller
falling below the contract price, then the reduction is opportu-
nistic. If the same inputs are used in both plants at no differ-
ence in the cost of the resources used to produce them, then
the owner's gain transfers wealth from the seller at the ex-
pense of at least the increased transportation costs. Of course,
other factors could motivate the reduction. For example, the
other plant might have lower costs or the owner might want to
take advantage of volume-based cost reductions by consolidat-
ing product runs into one plant. Independent of opportunism,
these motives could explain the -reduction even when input
prices had dropped.98
Reduction in requirements also occurs when the buyer
purchases a substitute product that can be put to the same use
as the contract good. One form of opportunism involves a
buyer who purchases a substitute that was available but was
relatively unattractive in price at the time the requirements
contract was formed, but that is now cheaper than the contract
price.99 Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate
98. For decisions sanctioning a large decrease, see, e.g., R.A. Weaver & As-
soc., Inc. v. Asphalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315, 1319-21 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (contrac-
tor of a government construction project had no requirements when
government legally changed contract specifications); Fort Wayne Corrugated
Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F.2d 471, 473-74 (3d Cir. 1942)
(court explicitly found that plant closing was not to avoid contract nor to divert
business to other of buyer's plants); Romine, Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 117
Ga. App. 353, 355, 160 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1968) (reduction of estimated require-
ments resulted from mistake in specifications without fault of either party);
Western Sign, Inc. v. Montana, 590 P.2d 141, 144 (Mont. 1979) (court implies that
seller unreasonable in belief that buyer's requirements would be in excess of
quantity actually ordered); Wilsonville Concrete Prod. v. Todd Bldg. Co, 281
Or. 345, 352, 574 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1978) (government contractor not required to
continue purchases under requirements contract when state terminated con-
tract); Berkeley City Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Vitro Corp. of America, 152 W. Va. 252,
262-72, 162 S.E.2d 189, 200-02 (1968) (the buyer of water requirements for 40
years closed an aircraft plant, built at a cost of $800,000 and planned for 700 em-
ployees. Small sums were involved-properly at issue was only the seller's
claim for $275 per month-relative to the magnitude of the cost of not using the
plant and evidence of good faith reasons for closing existed).
99. A more complicated problem involves a substitute either created after
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Co. 10 0 provides an illustration of an opportunistic substitution.
In Loudenback, a requirements buyer of phosphate rock used
the rock as a base for making "complete" fertilizer or treated it
with sulphuric acid to sell as "incomplete" fertilizer. For two
years, the buyer placed no orders, instead ordering "incom-
plete" fertilizer elsewhere. When the market price of the rock
rose, making the requirements contract more attractive than
purchases of the incomplete fertilizer, the buyer ordered the
maximum allowed under the contract. The buyer sued when
the seller refused to deliver, but the court sustained the seller's
demurrer, reasoning that the buyer's initial substitution of in-
complete fertilizer for the phosphate rock breached the con-
tract.' 0 ' This decision correctly deters opportunism-the
buyer's purchase of the incomplete fertilizer simply transferred
wealth from the seller to the buyer at the expense of the costs
incurred to arrange the purchase and any expenses the seller
incurred to sell elsewhere that would not have been incurred
without the breach.102
In contrast, Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Port-
land Cement Co. 10 3 presents a non-opportunistic substitution
situation. Portland Cement was a requirements buyer of gas
for fuel, heating, and other purposes in running its plant. At
the time the requirements contract with Southwest was
formed, Portland used boilers that produced waste heat that es-
caped into the air. When its boilers became unsafe, the com-
pany installed a new system with boilers closer to the plant
that used the waste heat, resulting in a large reduction in
purchases from Southwest. The court found the substitution to
be in good faith. Because Portland Cement apparently in-
curred only costs it would have borne without the require-
ments contract, 0 4 this result is consistent with deterring
opportunism.
Thus, requirements contracts present a recurring pattern.
Parties prefer simple contract language, in this case clauses
that do not precisely specify quantity. Yet, to avoid becoming
victims of opportunism, they incur costs that can offset the ad-
the contract began or developed through new technology that did not exist at
the time of the contract. See text accompanying notes 105-14 infra.
100. 121 F. 298 (6th Cir. 1903).
101. Id. at 304-05.
102. The buyer did avoid the cost of treatment, but this is strictly a private
saving since the "incomplete fertilizer" that he purchased was itself treated.
Id. at 299.
103. 102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939) (approved in U.C.C. § 2-306, comment 2).
104. Id. at 633.
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vantages of this simplicity. Because only some decreases are
opportunistic, a problem of subtlety exists, and the issue be-
comes how to distinguish opportunistic from nonopportunistic
behavior.
One approach treats the contract as if the buyer agreed to
refrain from any reductions so long as it remains in the busi-
ness for which it entered the contract.10 5 Under this approach,
reductions in requirements compel the buyer to pay the seller
the difference between the market price and the contract price
as well as the seller's additional costs of finding a substitute
buyer. Because there would also be costs of buying elsewhere,
the buyer reduces purchases only if the gains (for example,
purchasing a substitute whose price was below the market
price of the contract good) exceeded both the buyer and
seller's costs resulting from the buyer going elsewhere. Thus,
the buyer cannot gain at the seller's expense.
Such a rule of automatic buyer liability is not without
problems, however, the most obvious of which arise with the
development of new technology. Consider, for example, a late
nineteenth-century delivery firm, B, with a contract to buy its
horse-drawn cart requirements from S for $500 per cart (which
represents the cost of the resources used in production). As-
sume further that trucks are invented after the contract is
signed and sell for $500 each, that B wishes to purchase ten
trucks in the period remaining under the requirements con-
tract, and that, after the invention of trucks, carts fall to a price
of $250 (representing the new market as well as B's value for
105. For a decision reaching such a conclusion, see Chalmers & Williams v.
W. Bledsoe & Co., 218 IML App. 363 (1920). The Chalmerm court disapproved of
the use of new technology, but the analysis gave little attention to the circum-
stances of the transaction and was therefore less convincing than if it had
shown actions of the parties supporting its result. For example, in some cases
the seller has relied, with the buyer's knowledge and consent, on the expected
sales under the contract by making expenditures not otherwise justified. See,
e.g., Diamond Alkali Co. v. P.C. Tomson & Co., 35 F.2d 117, 118 (3d Cir. 1929)
(seller expanded his capacity to furnish buyer's requirements); Paramount
Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc. v. Hughes Printing Co., 2 Pa. D. & C. 3d 677, 679
(1977) (supplier of requirements of lithographic plates sunk costs on facilities
at a specific location in anticipation of buyer's printing press being ready and
when buyer moved press elsewhere, resulting in lack of requirements, court
found buyer in breach). For disapproval of an increase in requirements based
in part on similar buyer reliance, see Utah Intl, Inc. v. Colorado-Ute Elec. As-
soc., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (D. Colo. 1976) (when seller reasonably
planned for buyer's requirements based on buyer's plant capacity being 350,000
kilowatts, and buyer built for 410,000, court held seller liable only for require-
ments of the smaller size).
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carts used in B's business). 106 Finally, assume that B's cost of
making a truck contract is $100 and that S's additional cost of
selling the carts to someone else is $100.
Assuming for the moment that S has enough carts in stock
to satisfy B's needs, under the rule of automatic buyer liability,
B could breach only if it compensated S. To purchase the
equivalent of 10 trucks, the buyer would need to purchase 20
carts, 0 7 which means the buyer-liability rule would require B
to compensate S for its contract-market loss on 20 carts. 08
Given that B would also incur $200 from the cost of the truck
purchase and S's cost of resale, B will not breach. This result
can be justified on cost-minimizing grounds because it saves
the $200 from being spent. 0 9
Notice, however, that compared to a competitor who did
not buy carts at $500, B is at a disadvantage. Depending upon
the length of the contract and the importance of the new prod-
uct to B, compliance with the terms of the contract could force
B out of business. Although it is widely understood that a re-
quirements buyer bears the risk of other sellers more cheaply
providing the contract good, it does not follow that the buyer
also bears the risk of new technology producing a superior sub-
stitute for the contract good. Thus, in addition to opportunism,
courts must at least implicitly consider risk allocation in deter-
mining whether to establish a rule of buyer liabilty.11o
106. A substitute good priced below the market price of the contract good
exerts downward pressure on the market price of the latter good. Whether the
prices become equal depends upon whether the substitute can be used for all
uses of the contract good. In any event, if the contract good was selling at mar-
ginal cost before the price of the substitute dropped, the contract good will no
longer be profitable to produce, assuming there are no other changes in the de-
mand and cost for the contract good.
107. As represented in their respective prices, B values trucks at twice the
value of carts.
108. In other words, B faces an equal-cost choice considering just these ele-
ments of the liability rule: $10,000 under the contract for 20 carts at $500 each,
or $10,000 for the trucks plus damages (10 trucks at $500 each, plus contract-
market losses of $250 for each of the 20 carts).
109. If B is not liable to S, B will still prefer to buy carts at $250 if the costs
of their agreeing on the lower price are less than $100. This is simply an appli-
cation of the well-known Coase Theorem. See Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 6-44 (1960).
110. To a significant extent, the question of risk allocation is one of contract
interpretation. See note 95 supra and accompanying text. For example, an ex-
plicit term of the contract or industry custom might allocate risk. Thus, the re-
quirements buyer who purchases elsewhere when the market price drops is
not in bad faith in the unlikely event that the contract allocated the risk of such
a drop to the seller, thereby sanctioning the buyer's action. When the buyer
has assumed the risk of the market price falling, however, decreases in the
buyer's requirements should be policed via the opportunism standard. More-
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Aside from risk allocation considerations, the new technol-
ogy case raises other problems for a rule of automatic buyer li-
ability. For one, if B approaches S for a renegotiation of the
contract, the negotiation cost might exceed the costs of S sell-
ing and B buying elsewhere."' Moreover, if S does not have
the old product on hand, holding B liable would definitely raise
transaction costs. In our illustration, for example, because the
market value of carts is below their production costs, it would
not pay to make carts. S, however, could tell B that it will
make carts to meet B's needs unless B pays S not to produce.
Depending upon the extent of any competitive disadvantage, B
will make such a payment up to $4900.112 If B is not liable, B
will still buy trucks, but without the negotiation between B and
S, resources will be saved.
One can envision still other costs of the rule of buyer liabil-
ity. Because B must pay S even when the result is not oppor-
tunistic, settlements and trials will occur that could be avoided
with a rule that could better discriminate between good and
bad faith. Further, resolving issues such as what B's require-
ments would have been given B's purchase of a different prod-
uct, and whether S has spent the proper amount covering, can
be quite costly.
A more direct, case-by-case determination of opportunism
thus has advantages over the rule of automatic buyer liability.
The more direct approach also has disadvantages, particularly
in increased litigation and in other costs that result from uncer-
tainty. These disadvantages can be partly reduced by focusing
on objectively verifiable facts such as whether the market price
has dropped below the contract price and whether, if a substi-
over, the seller ordinarily assumes the risk of the contract price forcing the
buyer to charge a higher price than his competitors, thereby decreasing re-
quirements. See Weistart, supra note 93, at 610. To the extent risk allocation is.
a question of interpretation, the issue is analytically prior to that of opportu-
nism. Risk allocation can also be discussed in another sense, namely which
party is able to bear the risk at lower cost. See generally Posner & Rosenfeld,
Impossibility in Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6
J. LEGAL STuD. 83 (1977). Although discussion of this issue is largely beyond
the scope of this Article, in allocating risk of a new technology, it would also be
appropriate to consider the cost factors that the opportunism analysis reveals.
111. Although one could easily imagine that one transaction between S and
B would cost less than two transactions, S might doubt B's claim about immi-
nent bankruptcy because, for example, S may think that B has advantages over
B's competitors in other costs. Alleviating such suspicions would increase the
cost of the S-B bargain. There may also be a well-defined market for carts and
trucks, reducing the costs to B and S from B's buying elsewhere.
112. The amount B saves by buying 10 trucks as opposed to 20 carts at $500,
less B's $100 cost of making the truck contract, equals $4900.
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tute is purchased, the substitute involves technology developed
since the requirements contract was formed. If the market
price has not dropped, opportunism did not motivate the de-
crease;" 3 if a new technology is involved, it is more likely that
the seller bears this risk. In fact, courts have adopted the more
direct approach, resulting in numerous decisions consistent
with this opportunism rationale." 4
Problems created by a large increase in requirements are
in many ways similar to those of a large reduction. In general,
opportunism involves a buyer who, finding the contract price is
below the market price, incurs costs that other buyers without
the price advantage will not incur. For example, consider a
buyer who is a retailer. With a purchasing advantage, the re-
tailer could increase "requirements" to ship goods into markets
where it previously had not sold, but can now profitably sell
even with the increased transport cost. Despite the increased
transport cost, the buyer benefits at the seller's expense."15
113. This analysis assumes that no problems of the so-called "lost volume"
sale exist. A recent article argues that this problem is less frequent than many
commentators and judges believe. See Goetz & Scott, Measuring Sellers' Dam-
ages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L REV. 323 (1979).
114. A few caveats are in order. First, the substantial support in the deci-
sions for the opportunism theory comes from the results of the cases, not from
the judicial language describing the criteria supposedly applied. Because the
opportunism theory (and even on occasion good faith) is not explicit, some
cases present insufficient facts from which to determine whether they are con-
sistent with preventing opportunism. See, e.g., Cannonsburg Iron, Ltd. v. Mc-
Keever, 138 Pa. 184, 16 A. 97 (1888) (decrease in coal requirements approved
when buyer substituted natural gas). In other cases, the circumstantial evi-
dence of opportunism is strong and the court will stop its analysis there. See,
e.g., Smith v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 260 S.W. 545, 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924)
(buyer's requirements increased about three-fold when market price increased,
and decreased to previous level when market price went back down). In still
other cases, the court analyzes the problem as one of mutuality (i.e. considera-
tion), when opportunism may have been relevant. See, e.g., Intermountain Ru-
ral Elec. Assoc. v. Colorado Cent. Power Co., 322 F.2d 516, 518 (10th Cir. 1963)
(buyer purchased elsewhere, but court did not discuss possible reasons for this
on-its-face act of opportunism); Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869, 871-72 (7th
Cir. 1901) (contract to provide lumber void for lack of mutuality). An additional
caveat is that good faith is not the only relevant issue in determining the legal-
ity of a variation. See, e.g., notes 105, 110 supra and accompanying text (reli-
ance and allocation of risk). Finally, large increases in requirements produce
the most controversy over the appropriate standards. See note 120 infra.
An analysis of output decreases is similar to that of requirements. Rather
than a drop in the market price, however, a rise in the market price creates an
incentive to reduce sales under the contract. In addition, the output is occa-
sionally a by-product of some main product with changes in conditions of the
main product affecting the quantity of the by-product produced.
115. Whether any price reduction that consumers receive should count as a
benefit depends, in theory, upon the relationship of the buyer's price to the
marginal cost of production for the good. If the buyer can price below marginal
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The buyer might also engage in wholesale level competition
with its seller, adding an extra transaction cost in the sale to
the ultimate customers. Further, the buyer could spend more
in stockpiling and encourage its customers to do the same. A
final example of opportunism concerns a buyer who uses the
contract good as an input in its production process. Because of
a cost advantage from the contract, the buyer may seek to in-
crease output and in so doing may run its plant faster, thereby
increasing costs."l6
Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory"7
appears to involve an opportunistic increase in requirements.
When the price of glue rose from the contract price of 9c to 24e
a pound, the buyer increased its orders from 43,700 pounds for
the first nine months of 1916 to 126,000 pounds for the last three
months. The buyer apparently increased costs, in part by
stockpiling supplies and urging its customers to do the same.
The court found that the seller could lawfully refuse to fill the
orders." 8
Buyers, however, can have increases in requirements for
nonopportunistic reasons. If a buyer has a purchasing advan-
cost, the gain to consumers would be viewed, under conventional economic the-
ory, as a social loss. (The seller under the contract will sell below cost if it has
other profitable sales or expects future sales to bring costs and revenues into
balance.) If the buyer sold at above cost because competition was imperfect in
the buyer's or seller's industry, the reduction is a social gain. Because most in-
dustries are at least workably competitive and because a contracts case is an
improper device--given the small stakes usually involved-to decide difficult is-
sues of the state of competition in an industry, the analysis in the text ignores
any possible benefit from a lower price to consumers.
116. See Alchian, Costs and Outputs, in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 159
(2d ed. W. Breit & H. Hochman eds. 1971).
117. 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921).
118. Some of the facts regarding opportunism can be found only in the dis-
sent to the lower court opinion. See Oscar Schlegal Mig. Co. v. Peter Cooper's
Glue Factory, 189 A.D. 843, 845, 855-57, 179 N.Y.S. 271, 272, 279-80 (1919) rev'd, 231-
N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921). The court of appeals reached the same result as
the dissent, but relied on lack of consideration rather than on good faith.
For examples of opportunistic increases found to be in violation of the con-
tract, see City of Lakeland v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 352 F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla.
1973) (buyer of oil used in generating electricity entered into new sales of elec-
tricity to another electric company upon price rise); Dowd v. Hercules Powder
Co., 66 Colo. 302, 181 P. 767 (1919) (evidence that buyer, a user of product, stock-
piled and sold to other users); Orange and Rockland UtiL, Inc. v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 59 A.D.2d 110, 397 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1977) (very similar to City of Lakeland);
Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mendleson, 180 A.D. 9, 167 N.Y.S. 485 (1917) (in face of
large price increase and stated requirements, buyer did not meet its burden of
showing absence of speculation in increasing requirements); Moore v. Ameri-
can Molasses Co. of New York, 106 Misc. 262, 174 N.Y.S. 440 (1919) (court re-
fused to enforce part of increase that represented sales to "non-regular"
customers, including competitors of buyer).
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tage over its competitors, the buyer might engage in extra
purchasing for its existing stores without necessarily causing
any more resource expenditures than would occur without the
advantage; such purchasing would not be opportunistic, or in
bad faith. Moreover, increased demand from the industry in
which the buyer competes might cause a large increase in re-
quirements for nonopportunistic reasons. 119 Because allocation
of the risk of such increases is relevant, issues similar to those
concerning a new technology in the requirements cases are
raised.12 0
119. For examples of judges sanctioning nonopportunistic increases, see,
e.g., Marx v. American Malting Co., 169 F. 582 (6th Cir. 1909) (increase attribu-
table to a new plant expanding the buyer's capacity-seller knew of plant, and
construction apparently began before price rose); Johnston Pie Co. v. Acme
Egg & Poultry Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 376, 168 P.2d 762 (1946) (buyer in fact had the
requirements he claimed, although seller did not adequately discuss, nor did
court consider, possibility that earlier behavior of buyer was a breach);
Ehrenworth v. George F. Stuhmer & Co., 229 N.Y. 210, 128 N.E. 108 (1920) (both
parties desired sales of seller's pumpernickel bread to increase and over eight
years buyer's orders increased from 50-60 loaves to 3000-4000 loaves per week);
N.S. Sherman Machine & Iron Works v. Carey, Lombard, Young & Co., 100 Okla
29, 227 P. 110 (1924) (requirements of cement for use in construction of a water-
works were in fact above estimate). Other cases have allowed the increase in
the absence of proof of buyer bad faith. See, e.g., New York Central Ironworks
Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903).
120. Although the issues raised are similar, their resolution need not be.
For example, courts may find that sellers assume the risk of increases in de-
mand more (or less) often than they assume the risk of new technology.
U.C.C. § 2-306(1) clearly adds a standard in addition to good faith for gov-
erning quantity variations:
A term which measukes the quantity by the output of the seller or
the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or require-
ments as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably
disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated es-
timate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or require-
ments may be tendered or demanded.
(emphasis added).
The "except that" proviso is largely irrelevant if opportunism is useful in
understanding the good-faith limitation, as it appears to be. Nevertheless,
three points about the proviso are relevant here. First, the meaning of the pro-
viso is unclear. Comments 2 and 3 to § 2-306 only add to the confusion. Com-
ment 2 approves Southwest Natural Gas, discussed in text accompanying note
103 supra, in which the new requirements were less than 20 percent of the old,
and states that a complete lack of requirements could be permissible, while
comment 3 reasserts the importance of the proviso. Leading case authority and
commentary also supports the view that good faith decreases are permissable
regardless of any estimated requirements. See, e.g., R.A. Weaver & Assoc. v.
Asphalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weistart, supra note
93, at 625-39. Regarding increases, the Code proviso appears to have more of an
impact. See, e.g., Shea-Kaiser-Lockheed-Healy v. Department of Water &
Power, 73 Cal. App. 3d 679, 140 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1977). Second, at least as to in-
creases, the Code proviso may be only codifying the pre-Code law of some
states. See J. WHrru & R. SUMMERs, supra note 23, at 124-25. Although the lan-
guage of the increase in requirements decisions suggest that good faith is less
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3. Percentage Leases
Lessees in commercial leases frequently agree to pay rent
based upon a percentage of their gross receipts. Common ex-
amples require the lessee to pay a fixed amount or a percent-
age of receipts, whichever is greater, or to pay a fixed amount
plus a percentage of receipts over a stated sum. Such a lease
has benefits in allocating the risk of the lessee's venture, but it
also exposes the lessor to opportunism. A recurring problem
under percentage leases involves the lessee opening a new out-
let near the leased store while not expanding, curtailing, or
closing the leased store, thereby reducing receipts, and the rent
paid, from the level that would exist without the new outlet.
Many, although by no means all, decisions have considered
whether such lessees act in bad faith, and the courts have had
difficulty in determining the appropriate principles for guiding
these cases. 121 The question arises whether the implicit good
faith term is a low-cost method of policing the opportunism
problem that the otherwise desirable percentage lease arrange-
ment causes.
Opportunistic behavior provides a ground upon which to
separate good from bad faith. A lessee may open a new outlet
to increase profits, with the profits coming from lower costs or
increased sales (relative to those attainable with only the first
store). If the lease does not permit this action and if the lessee
would not have opened the new store but for the reduced
rental, the lessee has acted opportunistically and, accordingly,
can be said to have acted in bad faith. Under this circum-
stance, the lessee's act transfers wealth from the landlord to
the tenant at the expense of at least the costs of opening up the
second store, and at the expense of lessors in future cases who
important than in decrease cases, the results reveal a much closer correlation
to the opportunism rationale. See notes 110, 118, 119 supra. In addition, of the
pre-Code cases that on their facts disapprove an increase, issues such as reli-
ance and intent may explain at least some of their results. See notes 95, 105
supra and accompanying text. Third, rigid application of the proviso can lead
to anomalous results. For example, in Shea-Kaiser, the court imposed a maxi-
mum requirement when the actual requirements were greater and when the
court admitted that it may have been doing violence to the parties' intention.
Even here the opportunism rationale has, perhaps, some relevance for under-
standing the case since the court was aware of, but treated as irrelevant, a jury
finding of buyer stockpiling in calculating a verdict alternative to that on which
the court relied. See 73 Cal. App. 3d at 683 n.2, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 886 n.2.
121. See, e.g., Note, Resolving Disputes Under Percentage Leases, 51 Mnmu.
L REV. 1139, 1142-44 (1967); Note, The Lessee's Obligations Under a Percentage
Lease, 60 Nw. UJ.L REv. 677, 682-87 (1965). For a discussion of the approach of
many of the courts that do use good faith in this area, see notes 123-27 infra.
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take protective steps. Like buyers in requirements contracts
who decrease their purchases, a lessee has an incentive to di-
vert sales to new outlets when its original lease turns out to be
a "bad deal," as when the market rental drops after the lease is
formed.
Such opportunism is illustrated in Cissna Loan Co. v. Bar-
ron.122 Cissna had sold a department store business to Baron,
leasing to Baron the building in which the business was lo-
cated, with rent based on a percentage formula. Part way
through the lease term, Baron leased space on the second floor
of an adjoining building, opened a passage through the wall,
moved several of the more profitable departments into the new
space, and paid rent on only the reduced sales in the original
location. Because there appeared to be no "business" justifica-
tion for the diversion-for example, business had not outgrown
the space available-the costs spent in the diversion only trans-
ferred wealth at Cissna's expense.123
The possibility of a "business" justification presents in-
creased sales as a motive for such a move, and many courts
have recognized that bad faith should not be found where this
or some other "sound" business reason supports the diver-
sion.124 Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Tailored Wo-
man Inc. 125 provides a particularly graphic example. Tailored
Woman, already having a percentage lease on lower floors in a
Fifth Avenue building, rented from the same lessor the fifth
floor for a fixed amount. The business on the fifth floor, which
was unrelated to that on the lower floors, proved unsuccessful,
and Tailored Woman moved its fur business from a floor sub-
122. 149 Wash. 386, 270 P. 1022 (1928).
123. The court did not analyze the problem as one of good faith, but instead
argued that Baron promised to pay a percentage based on sales from its busi-
ness and that Baron operated one, not two, businesses. For case examples con-
sistent with the Cissna result, see Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d
136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955) (lessee moved retail operations a block away after les-
sor had spent more than $75,000 to prepare building for lessee's use). For cases
dealing with the reliance aspect, see note 127 infra; Seggebruch v. Stosot, 309
Ill. App. 385, 33 N.E.2d 159 (1941) (lessee opened up a gas station next door to
one on leased premises, causing sales on latter to fall from 12,000 to 200 gallons
per month); Slidell Inv. Co. v. City Prod. Corp., 202 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App.
1967) (lessee moved into a new location across street, evidence indicating that
business would have been equally successful in either location); Goldberg, 168-
05 Corp. v. Levy, 170 Misc. 292, 9 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1938) (complaint alleging that
tenant negligently or willfully diverted sales withstood a motion to dismiss).
124. See, e.g., Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d -248
(1964); Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954).
125. 309 N.Y. 248, 128 N.E.2d 401 (1955), affg, 283 A.D. 173, 126 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1953).
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ject to the percentage rental to the fifth floor. The facts indi-
cated that business boomed on both floors; thus, the removal of
the fur department did not reduce the total rent paid.126
This increased receipts situation indicates that identifica-
tion of opportunism may be clear in principle, but can be quite
difficult in practice. Comparing the profits from increased sales
with the costs of opening the second store requires determin-
ing what the lessee's sales would have been if it had stayed in
one store, a calculation which might require some knowledge
about the demand conditions in the first store's location. A fur-
ther complication would occur if the second store had lower
nonrent costs than the first, thus presenting a nonopportunistic
motive for diversion. The important issue is the lessee's moti-
vations-an issue that might be resolved by examining the rea-
sons for the lessee's projections that profits would increase.
Yet to the extent it risked a lawsuit, the lessee would have an
incentive to make questionable estimates or to act in a self-
serving way to conceal opportunitism. On the other hand, if
courts implied a duty of maximizing rent upon all lessees in
percentage leases, problems would arise similar to those that
would arise in requirements contracts if buyers were automati-
cally liable for reductions caused by diversions to other sellers.
Thus, it is not surprising that courts prefer a more case-by-case
approach to this issue. The difficulties of proof could be eased
by stopping diversions only in more obvious opportunism
cases, leaving lessors to protect themselves through the use of
explicit contractual clauses or other methods. Difficulties could
also be lessened by focusing the initial analysis on the objec-
tively verifiable fact of whether the lessee's move was to a
nearby location. If not, opportunism appears much less likely
to have motivated the move.127
126. See 283 A.D. at 178, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 577. The court of appeals noted that
the landlord proved no loss from lower rent, but found it unnecessary to con-
sider whether the move actually raised the rent. 309 N.Y. at 254, 128 N.E.2d at
403. Again, the result is correct although the court is not focusing explicitly on
opportunism.
For other examples of nonopportunistic diversions, see Food Fair Stores,
Inc. v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 200 A.2d 166 (1964) (lessee-grocery store owner
maintained leased premises but opened two new stores and planned a third in
the same fast-growing community as part of a normal expansion); Palm v.
Mortgage Investment Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (in last eight
months of a six year lease, lessee, having learned from lessor that he would not
be allowed to renew lease, opened a second store nearby, causing rent to
drop-second store opened because of need to maintain on-going business, not
to avoid rent, for which obligation to pay was about to end).
127. As with requirements contracts, other issues are relevant. An impor-
tant question is whether it can be inferred that the lessee promised to maxi-
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4. Bad Faith Interpretation
One example of bad faith is when a party seeks substitute
performance and, in so doing, argues incorrectly and unreason-
ably that the contract should be construed not to require com-
pensation to the other party. Resources used both in arranging
the substitute and in making the strained interpretation are
wasted, and courts have condemned such interpretations.128 Of
mize rents in the leased premises or made some other promise by which what
would otherwise be a good faith diversion could be condemned. Cf. Gulf State
Theatres v. Hayes, 534 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (lessee expressly
agreed to maximize rentals; evidence also existed of diversion only to avoid
paying percentage). Landlord reliance is one way to infer such a duty. See
notes 105, 123 supra. Nevertheless, some cases have treated the question of im-
plied covenant as the only issue in diversion cases, ignoring bad faith when fac-
tors such as a store opening nearby suggest a serious inquiry is necessary into
whether the diversion can be justified other than as an attempt to reduce rent.
See, e.g., Percoff v. Solomon, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So.2d 31 (1953) (new store opened
across the street); Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951)
(Lessee moved a restaurant to a location 1 1/2 miles away, substituting a less
successful one in its place. The court did not discuss whether the new location
had more business than the old.); Bobenal Inv., Inc. v. Giant Super Mkts., Inc.,
79 Mich. App. 31, 260 N.W.2d 915 (1977) (new store opened near by).
In cases like Cissna, see text accompanying notes 122-23 supra, whether
the diversion is condemned due to bad faith or to a promise to maximize rent
or to maintain the same type of business will not affect the lessor's recovery.
In other cases, however, the theory will make a difference. For example, in
Kretch v. Stark, 193 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio App. 1962), the lessee rented two adjacent
properties for use in selling clothes. The one subject to the lease in question
was rented a few months after the first. The lessee wanted to open the wall
between them, but the lessor refused. Eventually, the lessee sold clothes only
from the location not subject to a percentage rental. Although this shift of all
business to one store may have had costs resulting only in a loss to the lessor,
the court argued that there was no fraud, the lessee having made an honest
mistake in misjudging the lessor's willingness to open the wall, and refused to
imply a covenant to continued use of the leased premises. An implied promise
by the lessee not to divert in bad faith was not considered. The lessor asked
that the percentage rent be based on all sales in both stores. Such an award
would have exceeded that made in a bad faith decision, because at the time the
disputed lease was signed, the lessee planned to have sales in both stores.
Finally, as with requirements contracts, the possibility that the contract
permits diversion for any reason should be explored. See note 95 supra. One
argument for the lessee would be the right to sublease the premises to anyone
without the lessor's approval.
128. For examples of strained interpretations, see Henry G. Meigs, Inc. v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 273 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1960) (party argued that a con-
tract, which allowed it to receive $39,098.05 if a new contract was not negotiated,
did not require it to negotiate--the court rejected the interpretation as made in
bad faith); Mortgage Corp. v. Manhattan Say. Bank, 71 N.J. Super. 489, 177 A.2d
326 (1962) (the contract called for the bank either to pay fees for servicing the
mortgage until principal and interest were paid in full or, upon bank's termina-
tion of agreement, to pay the equivalent of four years of fees. The bank refi-
nanced the mortgage, treating the old mortgage as paid in full, thus refusing to
pay fees. The court held that since the mortgage corporation would never have
agreed to its rights being so easily made valueless, the bank's acts were not a
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course, calling the strained interpretation bad faith adds noth-
ing to an argument based upon standard principles of contract
interpretation, but what some consider an act of bad faith can
be seen as opportunism and can thus be condemned as raising
costs.
Another illustration of bad faith interpretation involves
conditions of satisfaction. Many contracts condition the obli-
gor's duty upon that party's being satisfied with the perform-
ance of the other party or with some other element of the
contract. If such a condition encompasses dissatisfaction based
upon any reason, the obligor could seek substitute performance
whenever the contract terms become unfavorable due to events
occurring after the contract was formed. Moreover, the obligor
could accept benefits already conferred without paying for
them simply by claiming dissatisfaction.
Because it seems likely that obligees would require a re-
drafting of conditions of satisfaction if they could be so broadly
construed, courts in this situation often recognize the problem
explicitly and take two steps to avoid obligor opportunism.
First, whenever possible, they require dissatisfaction to be
based on a reasonable person standard.129 Second, when the
contract explicitly allows personal dissatisfaction even if a rea-
sonable person would be satisfied or when it is impossible to
apply a reasonable person test, courts require the dissatisfac-
tion to be in good faith. By employing a good faith test, courts
seek to ensure that the claim is not based upon dissatisfaction
with something other than the quality of the performance ren-
dered.130 For example, in McCartney v. Badovinac,131 a Dr.
Ragsdale accused Mrs. McCartney of stealing a diamond from
his wife. Mr. McCartney hired Badovinac, a detective, to deter-
mine the facts "to the satisfaction" of McCartney. The detec-
tive presented his proof that Mrs. McCartney indeed was the
criminal, demonstrating her guilt "as certain as anything in
valid interpretation of the contract.); Westhill Exports, Ltd. v. Pope, 12 N.Y.2d
491, 191 N.E.2d 447 (1963) (National Enquirer hired broker to negotiate a con-
tract on its behalf, but later made arrangements elsewhere, denying any obliga-
tion to use broker's efforts--court held contract could not reasonably be read as
Enquirer claimed). See also L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CoNTRACr LAw
631-32, 637 (3d ed. 1972); Summers, supra note 81, at 244-46.
129. See, e.g., 3 A. CoRBin, supra note 1, §§ 644-646; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CoNTRAcTs § 254 (Tent Draft No. 1-7, 1973); Summers, supra note 81, at 240-
41. For a listing of many of the relevant cases, see Annot, 86 A.LR.2d 200
(1962).
130. See sources cited in note 129 supra.
131. 62 Colo. 76, 160 P. 190 (1916).
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human knowledge can be." 3 2 Mr. McCartney claimed dissatis-
faction, whereupon the detective successfully sued because of
Mr. McCartney's bad faith. He was not dissatisfied with
Badovinac's performance in determining the facts, but rather
with the facts themselves.
5. "Willful" Substantial Performance
The last example of good faith in performance concerns
cases in which a party renders only substantial, not complete,
performance.133 For example, a construction company may de-
viate insignificantly from contract specifications.134 In such
cases, the performing party is still liable for any damages from
the incomplete performance. It has been suggested that mea-
suring these damages should depend upon whether the devia-
tion was willful: if so, it was not in "good faith" and damages
should be measured by the cost of curing the defect. If the sub-
stitution was not deliberate, however, damages should be mea-
sured by the diminution in market value.135
"Willful" substantial performance does not involve oppor-
tunistic behavior. Assuming that damages are calculated by
the loss to the non-breaching party, no wealth is transferred at
the expense of the non-breacher. Indeed, if the damages are so
measured, the breach will occur only if it benefits the breach-
ing party more than the cost of damage it causes. For example,
the breaching party may use for a second job the resources
necessary to perform fully on the first contract, and thus may
receive more from the second job than the damages would be
to the non-breaching party of the first contract. The law should
then prefer breach (in this case willful substantial perform-
ance) because it will benefit the breacher without harming the
non-breacher once damages are paid. 3 6 Because there would
132. Id. at 78, 160 P. at 191 (quoting the trial court, whose findings and result
were affirmed).
133. Whether or not failure to perform is substantial depends upon several
variables. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 266 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1973). But see text accompanying notes 136-37 infra for a critique of aspects of
the Second Restatement.
134. An example is Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889
(1921) in which the deviation involved a substitution of materials that did not
reduce the market value of the structure.
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 231, Comment d, Ilustra-
tion 6 (Tent Draft No. 8, 1973). Although the Second Restatement section 266,
comment f, substitutes "good faith" for the "less precise" term "'villful," in il-
lustration 6 lack of good faith is equated with "deliberateness," which in this
context seems identical to "wilful."
136. The cost of completion damage award will not necessarily prevent re-
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be no opportunism in this case, it is not surprising that, al-
though some courts list willfulness as a relevant consideration,
there is considerable evidence that willfulness is rarely disposi-
tive in the substantial performance cases. As the leading trea-
tise on contracts details, numerous cases have found that
performance was substantial despite the deviation being willful
in the sense of its being intentional and deliberate. 3 7
Analysis of the five foregoing illustrations has demon-
strated that, despite the misuse of good faith in the substantial
performance context and the long-standing confusion over dis-
tinguishing good from bad faith, opportunism provides a princi-
pled basis on which to structure the concept of good faith in
performance. Given such a foundation, good faith becomes a
useful implicit term to facilitate reliance on simple explicit con-
tract terms, such as those fixing quantity by requirements or
rent by percentage of sales. What has appeared to be one of
the most ad hoc and contentless concepts in contract and com-
mercial law emerges instead as a doctrine capable of principled
application by courts and of beneficial use by contracting par-
ties.138
sources from moving to their highest valued use because the breaching party
may be able to buy out of the first contract. This extra negotiation is, however,
probably an added cost of the higher damage rule.
137. See 3A A. CoanmN, supra note 1, § 707; 5 id., supra note 1, § 1123. Some
courts have even tried to distinguish "willful" from "deliberate," making the
cases even more difficult to follow. Id. Focusing on willfulness is also inconsis-
tent with the fundamental maxim of contract law that damages are concerned
with relief, not compulsion. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Con-
tract, 70 COLum. L. REV. 1145, 1145-47 (1970). This is not to deny that there is a
difficult issue in substantial pezformance cases in determining the proper
measure of damages. The real issue of measuring damages by the drop in mar-
ket value or by the cost of completion in cases like Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v.
Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921), see note 134 supra, concerns whether the
subjective value of the non-breaching party is identical to the objective market
value. If the subjective value of the owner equals the objective market value,
then diminution in market value is the correct award. If, however, there is
strong reason to believe that there is a subjective value higher than the objec-
tive market value, then given the opportunity of the parties to bargain, cost of
completion is perhaps the best available method to protect that value.
138. A recent article provides a contrasting analysis of good faith in per-
formance. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980). To Professor Burton, the problem
of good faith arises when one party exercises discretion in performance that
controls the other party's potential benefit, a conclusion with which the oppor-
tunism analysis concurs. Discretion is exercised in bad faith when forgone op-
portunities are recaptured. Determining whether an opportunity is forgone
depends upon the reasonable expectations of the party dependent upon the ex-
ercise of discretion. Like opportunism, the forgone opportunities test makes
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C. TENDER OF NON-CONFORMING GOODS
When the seller tenders goods that differ from their con-
tractual description, generally the buyer may either cancel the
sale and return the goods to the seller, or obtain damages for
the nonconformity and keep the goods for use or resale.139
These remedies have different costs. If the buyer cancels the
sale, costs include those of returning the goods, the seller's
costs of resale and perhaps of correcting the defect, and the
buyer's costs of finding a substitute. If the buyer retains the
goods, costs include those of correcting the defect or, if the
buyer resells the item, those of resale and of obtaining substi-
tute performance.
Cost, however, is not the only distinction between the two
remedies. If the buyer has made a bad deal, either because of
incorrect valuation of the goods when signing the contract or
because the market price has since dropped, the buyer has an
incentive to return the goods to the seller. Such return trans-
fers wealth between the parties: the buyer desires to shift to
the seller the risk that the buyer had assumed in the price term
of the contract, and thus increase the buyer's wealth at the
good faith an implicit contractual term. Moreover, both tests scrutinize the mo-
tives behind discretionary acts.
The two tests, however, differ significantly in their focus, operation, and
cost. The forgone opportunities test, with its emphasis on reasonable expecta-
tions, apparently turns on the factual context surrounding contract formation.
Because both parties benefit at the time the contract is formed from an implicit
term against opportunism, however, under the opportunism test courts can as-
sume that the parties would not have permitted an act whose sole purpose and
effect is to transfer wealth. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The
question under the opportunistic behavior approach, therefore, is not what the
facts reveal about party expectations at the time of contracting, but instead
whether a subsequent act is considered opportunistic. Analysis of factual cir-
cumstances at the time of contract formation is, of course, occasionally relevant
to the opportunism test, as when the parties explicitly sanction an otherwise
opportunisitic act. See note 95 supra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, be-
cause factual contexts will sometimes suggest only a fragmentary picture of ex-
pectations, this Article asserts that good faith is more than, indeed cannot in
practice only be, a question of the factual circumstances that reveal the parties'
expectations. The more general focus of the opportunism test simplifies appli-
cation of the good faith concept, and hence reduces contracting costs. By con-
trast, dependence upon discerning reasonable expectations will induce parties
to make their expectations clearer at the time of formation, raising costs.
139. Under certain circumstances, the buyer who returns the goods can col-
lect damages. See U.C.C. § 2-711. Most of the discussion about tender of non-
conforming goods in this part is based on Priest, supra note 20. Priest does not
label the problem opportunism, however, although it clearly involves opportu-
nism as that term is defined in this Article. See id. at 966-68. More important,
the point emphasized in this Article is that other than the costs of drafting
around cost-raising legal rules, the possibility of opportunism is the prime
problem from a cost-minimizing standpoint.
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seller's expense. Whether the buyer can engage in this oppor-
tunistic behavior depends significantly on contract law. If the
law allows the buyer to manipulate the choice of remedy, he or
she may try to return otherwise acceptable goods, for example
by "inventing" defects or exaggerating immaterial defects.
Buyer resources spent in such activites, seller resources spent
to counter them, and additional resources used when buyer re-
tention of the goods is less costly, are all wasted.140
Professor Priest's exhaustive analysis of the U.C.C. deci-
sions dealing with this problem, however, indicates that the
case results are consistent with preventing opportunism.141 For
example, he reports that the courts have generally limited the
buyer's ability to return goods, particularly when the material-
ity of the defect and the nature of the buyer's behavior increase
the likelihood that the buyer was opportunistic. 42
When opportunistic returns are thus removed, the only dif-
ference between the two possible remedies is one of costs. One
of the buyer's two possible remedies will have lower costs than
the other, depending upon the relative values of the non-con-
forming goods to the buyer and seller. These relative values
depend largely upon the relative costs to the buyer and seller
of correcting the nonconformity or of reselling the goods, and
upon the value of the defective goods to other buyers. For ex-
ample, if the buyer values the goods more than other potential
buyers would, returning the goods to the seller would produce
the costs listed above and would thus be more costly relative to
retaining them.143 If others value the defective goods more
140. Sellers will have an incentive to seek return of the goods when the
price rises and thus can act opportunistically. In the normal "one-shot" trans-
action, the only breaches that the buyer can commit are not paying at all or
paying late. The seller will have difficulty causing such breaches. In cases of
ongoing performance on both sides such as on installment contracts, however,
the seller may have more chance for manipulating the buyer's performance.
Professor Priest found that in installment contracts, courts have indeed policed
against apparent seller, as well as buyer, opportunism. See Priest, supra note
20, at 982 n.44, appendix at 31-36 (unpublished).
141. See Priest, supra note 20, at 981-1000. As Priest acknowledges, Karl
Llewellyn, among others, also understood that return of the goods could'allow
the buyer to gain at the seller's expense. See Llewellyn, On,,Warranty of Quali-
ty, and Society (pt. 2), 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341, 389 (1937):,Llewellyn also recog-
nizes, as does Priest, that return of the goods could not be eliminated entirely
as a possible remedy. See id., at 388. In some instances damages may be inad-
equate to the buyer relative to the return of the goods remedy, for example, be-
cause of the difficulty of calculation. See Priest, supra note 20, at 965.
142. This is seen most explicitly in the installment sale cases. See note 140
supra.
143. If the costs of correcting the defect are the same for all parties, then
the buyer would not choose resale (with its attendant costs) since the value ob-
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than the buyer and the buyer's cost of resale is less than the
total of the seller's resale cost plus the cost of returning the
goods, then buyer retention and resale is the lower cost alter-
native.
The parties will adopt the cost-minimizing remedy if the
only difference is costs, because neither party wants to in-
crease their joint costs. For example, assume that resale is pre-
ferred and that the buyer can resell at a cost less than the
seller's resale cost plus the costs of returning the goods. Once
opportunism is not attractive, parties will have the buyer resell
even if contract law allows the buyer the option of returning
the product and forces the seller to pay the costs.144
D. FRANCHISING
As noted earlier,145 franchisees can "cheat" on quality in
ways that are costly to detect and prove. Moreover, clauses
specifying elements of quality will often prove expensive to
draft in complete detail and certainly to enforce in court, mak-
ing them an unattractive solution. Accordingly, the search for
less costly contractual alternatives is important. One such so-
lution is a clause allowing the franchisor to terminate "at will."
If such clauses are enforced, the franchisor can more effectively
eliminate cheating because the costs of proving cheating to an
external observer, such as a court, would be avoided and the
franchisee would know that detection results in swift termina-
tion.
The enforceability of these clauses, however, has been at-
tacked on different grounds over the years. Historically, the ar-
gument was that, because the franchisor had not been bound to
tained in resale would be less than the buyer would be willing to pay. Further,
because the cost of correcting the defect or the diminution in market value,
whichever is lower, would be at least an implicit cost of the seller's resale (the
seller would have to discount by the cost of correction if it did not correct it-
self), return to the seller could cause costs that buyer retention avoids.
144. This is another application of the Coase theorem. See note 109 supra.
It does not follow, however, that all legal rules have equal costs. If the legal
rule does not require the parties to choose the cost minimizing alternative, they
will bargain to select that alternative unless the costs of the negotiation exceed
the benefits of the alternative. Thus, nonoptimal rules will be more costly by
requiring additional bargains. Professor Priest found that several U.C.C. provi-
sions in the non-conforming tender area are not optimal as written. See, e.g.,
Priest, supra note 20, at 974-75 (substantial peformance test for buyer return of
goods not directly related to cost minimization); id at 979 (Code does not com-
pensate seller for buyers' use of goods, including depreciation, between accept-
ance and revocation of acceptance).
145. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
do anything, the contract lacked consideration. Thus, parties
using an "at will" clause could not be assured that their con-
tract was binding. By 1940, however, most courts had recog-
nized that franchise contracts were enforceable even if
terminable at will.146 More recently, under "Franchisee Day in
Court Acts" and various contractual doctrines, an attempt has
been made to protect franchisees against "arbitrary" termina-
tion and even to give them a right to renew their arrangements
on "reasonable" terms.147 The most common ground for advo-
cating this position emphasizes the necessity of reconciling the
"disparity in bargaining power" between the franchisor and the
franchisee. Indeed, the terminable at will clause is considered
evidence of such a disparity. How else could such a one-sided
contract be explained? When the problem of franchisee cheat-
ing is considered, however, the clause's function becomes un-
derstandable. The clause is a lower-cost method than is
litigation of reducing the franchisee's incentive to cheat.
146. Compare Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange" Crush Co., 296 F. 693
(5th Cir. 1924) (no consideration) with Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1940) (no consideration theory is not "ap-
propriate" to resolve dispute concerning termination under an "at will" clause).
See Gellhorn, Limitations on Contractual Termination Rights-Franchise Can-
cellations, 1967 DuKx L.J. 465, 463-94 (1967); Gilmore, supra note 38, at 34 (dis-
cussing the similar problem that contract law had with requirement contracts).
Although franchisees often used the no consideration argument to refuse to fol-
low terms of the agreement such as accepting certain shipments from the
franchisor, franchisors occasionally justified termination by arguing that with-
out consideration there was no contract to begin with and hence the termina-
tion could not be challenged. See Note, 28 Nw. U.L Rxv. (previously Inr. L.
REV.) 800, 804-07 (1934).
Under the doctrine of consideration, there were mutual rights, with a
franchisor at least promising to give notice of the termination. Not to enforce
the clause for "lack" of consideration was in effect to question the adequacy of
consideration, something that contract law has long eschewed.
147. See Texaco, Inc. v. Appleget, 63 N.J. 411, 307 A.2d 603 (1973). Contra
Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979). See generally Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Rela-
tionship, 49 TEx. L. REv. 650 (1971); Gellhorn, supra note 146.
Judicial interpretations of the U.C.C. concerning whether terminations
*under "at will" clauses must be made in "good faith" are inconsistent. Com-
pare Tele-Controls, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967) (U.C.C.
§ 1-203, which requires good faith in every contract and which cannot be "dis-
claimed by agreement," prohibits termination without cause) with Corenswet,
Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979) (given pre-Code
Iowa decisions, § 1-203 and § 1-102 will not be interpreted to prevent arbitrary
termination under "at will" clause) and Rockwell Eng'r Co. v. Automatic Tim-
ing & Controls Co., 559 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977) (in an agency contract of indefi-
nite term, rather than applying § 1-203 and § 1-102, which *ere not mentioned in
the opinion, court applied U.C.C. § 2-309, allowing contracts of indefinite term to
be terminated at any time by either party upon reasonable notice, making con-
tract terminable at will regardless of bad faith).
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Franchisors and non-cheating franchisees benefit from the re-
sulting reduction both of cheating and of the costs necessary to
terminate cheaters. 4 8
If this were the entire story concerning the terminable at
will clause, its unrestricted use would be beneficial; but
franchisor opportunistic behavior under the clause must also
be considered. Because the franchisee often invests in building
and fixtures that may be more useful in the current franchise
than in alternative uses, a value exists that the franchisor could
appropriate if given the opportunity. Moreover, franchisees
often pay fees that are nonrefundable if they are terminated. If
the terminable at will clause is interpreted literally, franchisors
could terminate solely to capture these values.49
Important nonlegal checks deter franchisor opportunism.
If a franchisor terminates a franchisee without at least some
colorable claim of cheating on quality, the incentives of the re-
maining franchisees to maintain quality will decline and the
franchisor will find it more difficult to procure additional quali-
fied franchisees.150 A franchisor might accept this cost if it is
willing to engage in mass turnover from franchise to company-
148. The "at will" clause also avoids a possible court battle when the
franchisor desires to terminate an "inept" franchisee, such as one who can not
meet reasonable sales quotas. That these benefits of the clause exist does not
prohibit scrutiny of the clause for procedural unconscionability: procedural un-
conscionability does not involve the concept of disparity of bargaining power.
See generally Epstein, supra note 73.
149. For a more detailed discussion of franchisor opportunism upon which
this Article draws, see Klein, supra note 2, at 359-60. As Klein argues, the exist-
ence of this appropriable value also deters franchisee cheating because it in-
creases the loss to the franchisee from being caught. Id. at 359.
Contrary to Klein's argument, this analysis of franchising does not under-
mine the analysis of stipulated damages. See notes 158-80 infra and accompa-
nying text. Although a penalty clause would deter cheating for the same
reason, from the franchisor's standpoint such a clause is relatively inefficient
even if penalties are freely enforced because it involves court enforcement to
prove cheating that the creation of the appropriable value and the use of the
terminable at will clause are designed to avoid. Nor is it a sufficient answer, as
other commentators have claimed, that the parties can always protect them-
selves through contractual clauses. See note 177 in fra and accompanying text.
150. Although this check may exist in the other examples to deter opportu-
nistic behavior, see notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text (discussing the im-
portance of reputation), the continuous dealing in franchising is of particular
importance to the relationship because of the existence of multiple franchisees.
Another complication in the franchise context is that the franchisor may
engage in a non-opportunistic termination without any evidence of franchisee
cheating. If demand will fall such that some franchisees will be put out of busi-
ness, those franchisees have an incentive to cheat on quality because neither
termination nor a loss of future sales deters them. Accordingly, the franchisor
might engage in "preemptive" termination. See generally Klein & Leffier, supra
note 2.
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owned outlets, or if it can hide the opportunistic nature of the
terminations. The higher costs of a company outlet relative to
the costs of franchising, however, may produce net losses from
terminating franchisees opportunistically. These higher costs
may arise from decreased incentives of employees, compared
to those of franchisees who have "a piece of the action," which
could result in lower relative productivity of employees. Al-
though the franchisor can increase employee incentives
through profit sharing, pension plans, and other such measures,
making franchisee and employee incentives equivalent creates
the possibility of opportunistic firing of employees. After op-
portunistically terminating its franchisees, however, the
franchisor would have difficulty finding employees willing to
subject themselves to possible opportunism.15'
Little evidence currently exists that measures the effective-
ness of these market incentives in policing franchisor opportu-
nism.1-2 Because information is costly and because franchisee
termination alone does not prove that a franchisor behaved op-
portunistically, termination presents a problem of subtle oppor-
tunism. Although one cannot conclude a priori that actual
franchisor opportunism is nonexistent or even infrequent, even
if the market checks are assumed to be effective, it does not
necessarily follow that the law has no role in deterring
franchisor opportunism. Contract law might lower the costs of
deterrence. If the phrase "at will" is understood to include op-
portunistic terminations, then the resulting set of contracts will
be optimal. A different understanding of the phrase, however,
might lower costs. Contract law might reduce the costs of pro-
151. An unresolved issue concerns why many firms initially use employees
rather than franchisees. A partial explanation may be that the legal movement
to protect franchisees (including the movement in antitrust law) has made
their use less attractive. See generally Klein, supra note 2, at 365-67.
152. Klein contends that franchisor opportunistic behavior is rare or even
nonexistent, although he states that his conclusion is based only on casual em-
piricism. See Klein, supra note 2, at 360. Of course, to listen to franchisees and
franchisors, opportunism by both groups is rampant. See Penn, Franchisers
Are Often on Outs With Outlets, Especially in Fast Food, Wall St. J., Jan. 2,
1979, at 1, col. 6. For a recent case with evidence of the franchisor attempting
opportunistic terminations, see Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704
(7th Cir.) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1979) (although it could not terminate "at
will," franchisor made more profits from company-owned than franchised
stores, and was found to have acted to-eliminate franchisees, including coercing
them to terminate on terms favorable to franchisor). Cf. Chrysler Corp. v.
Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958) (to the benefit of Chrysler, Quimby be-
came sole stockholder of auto retail corporation that was one of Chrysler's fran-
chisees; Chrysler then terminated the franchise, obtaining the benefit of
Quimby's action, but destroying its value to Quimby).
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tecting franchisees against franchisor opportunism by presum-
ing that the parties have agreed not to engage in opportunistic
behavior unless they explicitly state to the contrary. Given
that franchisees often lose large investments in property, repu-
tation, and time if the franchise is terminated, they would pre-
sumably not lightly expose themselves to this hazard. Thus,
nonopportunism may be a reasonable interpretation of "at will"
clauses. 5 3
Before concluding that judicial adoption of this interpreta-
tion could lower costs, one must consider the costs of the judi-
cial system. These costs are likely to be significant, for at least
two reasons. First, there is the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween opportunistic and other terminations. Some indirect evi-
dence could be considered, such as: 1) existence of a
franchisee investment that can be appropriated, 2) franchisor
evidence of a nonopportunistic reason for termination, and 3)
mass termination of franchisees. Such evidence, however, ap-
pears more ambiguous than, for example, the existence of un-
anticipated circumstances giving rise to a mutually beneficial
reason for a modification. Although the first type of evidence
states a prerequisite for franchisor cheating, an inference of op-
portunism does not follow given the possibility of franchisee
cheating and our lack of knowledge about the frequency of ei-
ther type of cheating. The second type of evidence is impor-
tant, but uncertainty over judicial interpretation of such
evidence is a major reason for the very existence of the "at
will" clause. The franchisee can sometimes reasonably dispute
the franchisor's evidence and, in any event, claim that opportu-
nism was the "real" reason for the termination.154 Only the
third type of evidence raises a clear, albeit rebuttable, infer-
153. Klein contends that the "at will" clause is understood this way, but
that it is also understood that court enforcement of this implied understanding
is not allowed. See Klein, supra note 2, at 360. In any event, judicial reaction to
that clause affects how the parties understand its meaning.
154. For example, the franchisee can claim that the problems existed for
many years or also exist with other franchisees, yet were or are being ignored.
For a detailed discussion of the arguments that both parties make when an ex-
ternal observer decides the legality of a proposed termination, see S. MACAU-
LEY, LAw AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 148-58 (1966). Although Macauley is
sympathetic with the movement to protect franchisees, in referring to the Wis-
consir statute to protect automobile dealers, he concludes that "[slince the
manufacturer has no clear line as to what is and is not permitted, the safe
course is to do nothing that might be questionable. Unfortunately, this may be
inconsistent with demanding the utmost efficiency from dealers and pushing
them hard to get it." Id. at 156. See id at 162. But see id. at 164-88 (arguing
that movement to assist dealers contains both costs and benefits).
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ence of franchisor expropriation.155 Judicial intervention could
be limited to focus only on this fact, but, without knowing how
much franchisor opportunism exists even without mass termi-
nation, one cannot be confident that this solution is correct.
This lack of objective information increases the costs of ju-
dicial resolution of the termination problem. Further, current
judicial performance itself is perhaps even more important in
increasing these costs. Although some of the current judicial
and legislative movement to protect franchisees is undoubtedly
aimed at perceived franchisor opportunism, the focus on bar-
gaining power and on franchisee "rights" to a job indicate a
misunderstanding of the underlying problem: both the
franchisor and franchisee can act opportunistically. Given this
misdirected judicial performance, the unusually powerful na-
ture of the market check against opportunism that is created by
the existence of multiple franchisees,156 and the lack of objec-
tive criteria to identify opportunism, 5 7 the only certain situa-
tion for judicial intervention would be in the mass termination
case. At the least, however, judicial recognition of the underly-
ing problem should reduce some of the uncertainty and, ac-
cordingly, costs in this area of contract law.
E. PENALTY CLAUSES
Contracting parties occasionally stipulate the dollar
amount that the breaching party must pay the nonbreacher.
Although these clauses are usually enforced and accordingly
categorized as liquidated damages, they are sometimes not en-
forced as penalties. To be deemed a penalty, a necessary
though not sufficient condition is that the amount of the clause
must overcompensate the injured party for the damages from
the breach. A recent article by Professors Clarkson, Miller, and
myself suggested that a rational distinction exists between liq-
uidated damages and penalties. 15s Although the term was not
then used, the problem that the distinction avoids is opportu-
nistic behavior.
155. For example, one case of mass termination appeared to follow a court
interpretation unfavorable to the franchisor and was not an attempt to exp-
propriate. See Klein & McLaughlin, Resale Price Maintenance, Exclusive Terri-
tories and Franchise Termination: The Coors Case (unpublished working
paper 1979).
156. This check is unusually powerful relative to the other examples dis-
cussed in this Article.
157. This problem makes it more difficult for even properly focused judicial
intervention to be effective.
158. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 9.
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Damage clauses stipulating an amount that exceeds the ac-
tual damages create an incentive to engage in opportunistic be-
havior. With the inclusion of such a clause, a promisee has
more to gain from the promisor's breach than from perform-
ance, giving the promisee an incentive to expend resources in
procuring a breach. These resources, plus those the promisor
spends to counter the promisee's efforts, are socially wasted.
As with other forms of opportunistic behavior, their only pur-
pose is to transfer wealth. Before the clause can be condemned
as opportunistic, however, the promisee must have an opportu-
nity to induce the breach. Because detection of such induce-
ment results in nonenforcement of the clause, parties will use
subtle inducement that courts are unable to detect easily. We
suggested several possible situations in which such behavior
could occur,15 9 finding that the case law apparently enforces
stipulated damage clauses unless there is both an opportunity
and an incentive to induce breach.160 The effect of the cases
therefore adds to stipulated damages clauses an implicit condi-
tion that the courts will police enforcement of the clauses
against possible opportunistic behavior. Decisions that treat
stipulated damage clauses as penalties do not appear to involve
clauses designed to overcompensate the nonbreacher, but in-
stead seem usually to involve other circumstances, particularly
clauses that were a reasonable estimate of the damages from a
set of events that did not occur.1 61 Thus, when the anticipated
events do not occur, parties can ignore the problems of oppor-
tunistic behavior because the clause in fact becomes an unen-
forceable penalty.
Although our policy distinction explains the cases with a
high degree of accuracy,1 62 some contend that the distinction
159. Id. at 368-72. Because a stipulated damage clause is sometimes the
only manner in which a party would receive damages, in these cases the par-
ties will be reluctant to solve the problem of opportunistic behavior by not us-
ing a clafise.
160. See id. at 378-90.
161. The sources in Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 9, cite directly or
indirectly dozens of stipulated damage clauses that were not enforced. Rough-
ly one-fifth of these cases did not provide sufficient facts from which one could
rigorously discern the specific nature of the underlying transaction. Cases from
this subset, however, almost always involved situations similar to those found
in cases which gave sufficient facts; thus, their nature appears accurately re-
flected in the text accompanying this footnote. By far the most numerous class
of "penalties" involved clauses that were not drafted to apply to the facts as
they occurred-in particular, cases when, unexpectedly, no damages occurred
with the breach. Moreover, a small percentage of decisions cannot be ex-
plained by our or any other theory. See id. at 351, 378 n.74.
162. Id. at 378-90. Particularly telling are cases without either opportunity
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between liquidated damages and penalties is unwarranted, os-
tensibly on three grounds. First, some critics suggest that im-
portant groups of beneficial stipulated damage clauses are not
enforced. 163 They charge that liquidated damage clauses can-
not presently be used to recover nonprovable damages, particu-
larly when the damages are based on the subjective valuation
of the parties. Individuals are thus deterred from entering into
contracts without the clause, because normal rules for recover-
ing damages would undercompensate the injured party.16 4
Under our analysis, however, if the amount specified by the
clause is closely related to the damages likely to be actually
suffered, little incentive exists to engage in opportunistic be-
havior. Accordingly, stipulated damage clauses for this pur-
pose should be enforced. Nonenforcement of these clauses
would warrant criticism of the current distinction between liq-
uidated damages and penalties, although not necessarily of our
suggested distinction. In fact, however, there is little or no evi-
dence that courts classify as penalties clauses that involve un-
provable damages, and other evidence indicates that courts will
enforce such clauses. 165
Another type of clause that is considered beneficial yet cur-
rently unenforceable is created by a new entrant to an industry
who agrees to pay damages upon breach in excess of the
amount needed to compensate the nonbreacher.166 This clause
may serve as a substitute for having a reputation for prompt
performance, and, being less costly for a new entrant than of-
fering a lower price, it facilitates entry. Although new entrants
might offer to stipulate damages for this informational rea-
son,167 no obvious reasons exist why the amount of the clause
need exceed the compensatory level. Consider a construction
company debating whether to use a new subcontractor or an
existing one. The new subcontractor can offer a stipulated
damage clause that will fully compensate the construction com-
pany for damages that occur, including damages that would not
or incentive to induce breach, which are freely enforced regardless of whether
the amount of the clauses bears a reasonable relationship to the amount of
damages. Id. at 383-87.
163. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977).
164. See id. at 567-68.
165. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 9, at 379-80.
166. See A. KRoNmAN & &. POsNER, THE EcoNomics oF CONTRACT LAw 224
(1979).
167. Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 9, at 367-68.
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be covered absent any stipulated damage clause, such as un-
certain damages, consequential damages, the costs of litigation,
and attorneys' fees.168 All else being equal, the contractor will
prefer a contract containing this clause to one without it and
will accept the new subcontractor if the benefits of the clause
outweigh the costs of the lack of a reputation.
Thus, through a fully-compensatory liquidated damage
clause, the new firm can overcome its reputational disadvan-
tage without offering a lower price. The new entrant in effect
signals that it will cover all costs of its failure to perform. Be-
cause of their reputation, established competitors of the new
entrant will presumably accept the same clause only at a
higher price than the new entrant. Even if some competitors
are willing to sign stipulated damage clauses, the new entrant
will still offer two advantages. First, it can make the clause
fully-compensatory, for example, by agreeing to pay for conse-
quential damages, attorneys' fees, and other costs of collection.
Second, it can reduce the cost of transacting by engaging in
minimal negotiation regarding the clause. The new entrant will
be at a disadvantage only if established firms offer equivalent
clauses at the same price and with the same level of negotia-
tion. In this unlikely case,' 69 the new entrant can either raise
the amount of the clause or lower the price of performance.
Lower prices are the likely alternative in this unusual case.
The contractor will prefer a lower price with the fully-compen-
satory clause to a more-than-compensatory clause at a price re-
flecting its incremental expected value, unless the contractor
wants to engage in speculation about breach. Given that an
over-compensatory clause gives the contractor, who already
has the opportunity, the incentive to induce breach, the new
entrant will probably have some qualms about the risk of
breaching. If it has such qualms or if competition forces the
new entrant to respond to the desires of its consumers, it will
prefer to offer a lower price with a stipulated damage clause
168. For a detailed discussion of the enforceability of reasonable attorneys'
fee clauses, see Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516,
344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976). See also S. WuImsToN, supra note 32, at
§ 786. As Williston notes, a few states regard most attorneys' fee clauses as
necessarily unreasonable. For a recent example, see Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Win-
burn Tile Mfg. Co., 461 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1972) (Arkansas law).
169. The case is unlikely because it appears that most stipulated damage
clauses are not fully-compensatory. For example, of the over 40 construction
company cases referred to in our earlier Article, see note 9 supra, not one was
fully-compensatory in the sense used here.
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that is fully-compensatory rather than a clause stipulating a
higher amount.
Besides lacking a reputation for prompt performance, the
new entrant may have the further disadvantage of being per-
ceived as less likely than established firms to pay damages
upon breach. An overcompensatory clause will not affect this
disadvantage for the individual new entrant.70 If in fact the
new entrant breaches and is judgment-proof, the right to collect
an overcompensatory amount will not benefit the injured party.
Even if it did, if the risk of nonpayment were substantial the
customer of the new entrant could better protect itself by ob-
taining a bond from the new entrant. For reasons discussed in
the preceding paragraph, the bond is unlikely to be for an over-
compensatory amount unless the promisee wants to speculate
on a breach, probably an empirically trivial occurrence.' 7 '
170. Leaving aside as beyond the scope of this Article the question of
whether such an arrangement would be enforced in bankruptcy, an over-com-
pensatory clause could benefit the promisee if it allowed the promisee to re-
cover more than he or she othewise would in a bankruptcy proceeding. But the
purpose of the clause in this case would not be to overcompensate the prom-
isee, but to minimize undercompensation. Thus, if a bankruptcy did not occur,
the clause could be called a penalty without hindering this purpose.
The chance that some of several promisors for the same project could not
pay any damages upon breach raises the possibility of using an over-compensa-
tory clause in each of the contracts to provide ex ante for a compensatory re-
turn. To use an extreme example for the sale of illustration, a lender of $100 to
five individuals might require each to pay $500 (plus interest) upon breach if
the lender found all of them as likely to breach and only one as likely to pay
damages. See Clarkson Miller & Muris, supra note 9, at 364-65. Spread over the
five borrowers, the clauses are ex ante compensatory, although over-compensa-
tory as to each contract. As long as the ex ante conditions hold, there is no in-
centive for opportunism and hence the clauses should be enforced. It would
not defeat the usefulness of the over-compensatory clause in these cases, how-
ever, if the courts scrutinize these clauses as a class for ex post overcompensa-
tion. Indeed, such scrutiny would save potential victims at least some of the
expenses of policing against opportunism. I know of no cases discussing this
type of clause, and, although our theory would support its use, practical rea-
sons might militate against it, including its infrequent use by contracting par-
ties. See text accompanying notes 178-79 infra.
171. Not only would the promisee have to compensate the promisor (the
party who would pay under the clause) for the increased risk, but the promisor
is also more apt to know the correct likelihood of his or her own breach, mak-
ing the "bet" a poor one for the promisee. Moreover, the promisor has an im-
portant reason to be wary of speculation if the promisee can induce breach in a
manner difficult to detect. In short, the promisor will be less likely to gamble
when the game is not honest and games on which players are able to bet are
less likely to be honest. Finally, parties wanting to speculate can find many
other methods of speculation that involve well-defined markets for that activity.
If it is empirically trivial, allowing speculation is not worth the costs of opportu-
nistic behavior that would result from enforcing all stipulated damage clauses.
When opportunistic behavior is not a problem, and thus the game is "honest,"
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A second criticism of the liquidated damages/penalty dis-
tinction involves the costs of making it. The argument is that
the distinction is not optimal if it increases costs to a level that
more than offset the benefits of eliminating opportunistic be-
havior. The distinction arguably increases litigation expenses
and, because of the confusion surrounding it, results in an oc-
casional judicial mistake. The current distinction does not ap-
pear, however, to entail significantly higher litigation costs than
would the alternative of enforcing all stipulated damage
clauses, particularly given the nuances of proposed alternative
rules.i7 2 The adoption of our proposed rationale would reduce
confusion over the distinction, thereby reducing related costs.
As for benefits, the gains from avoiding opportunistic behavior
may not be large. If they indeed are small, then even a moder-
ate increase in litigation costs would make the rule more costly
than enforcing all clauses. There are several reasons, however,
why the costs of engaging in and protecting against breach in-
our distinction would allow enforcement of even clauses entered into for specu-
lation.
Two other recent observations on penalty clauses are worth noting. First,
Schwartz argues that "[iiquidated damage clauses are not likely to inspire
many attempts to induce breach.., for if the penalty is high, the promisee
would have to go to great lengths to get the promisor not to perform."
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE LJ. 271, 292 n.59 (1979).
The point is a good one, and it supports our position. Promisees will guard
against inducement; this is costly, even if in equilibrium little inducement actu-
ally occurs. Unless promisees could eliminate inducement entirely and promis-
ors thought it fruitless to attempt inducement, two conditions unlikely to occur
in a world of positive information costs, penalties still create the problem we
discuss.
Second, although not discussing the legal rules for stipulated damage
clauses, a recent article implies that a penalty clause would internalize what is
now an external benefit, namely free-riding on the efforts of a competitor to
find a good contractual match by inducing that match to breach. See generally
Diamond & Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract,
I: Steady States, 10 BELL J. OF ECON. 282 (1979). The law, however, probably
already avoids this problem under circumstances in which the authors postu-
late that it would occur since the "free-rider" will have to pay the non-breach-
ing parties' costs of finding a suitable substitute match. There is also evidence
that the externality occurs infrequently, if at all. See Landes & Posner, Joint
and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 552-55
(1980).
172. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 9, at 376-77. Relative to a rule
enforcing all clauses, the current distinction avoids the costs of renegotiating
and of identifying and drafting around exogenous events that might require
payment of stipulated damages. Litigation costs might not significantly de-
crease (or even decrease at all) under the proposals to eliminate the distinc-
tion because those proposals would allow other legal challenges to the clause.
Moreover, understanding of the distinction that has been articulated here
would, if accepted, reduce the costs of litigation.
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ducement would not be trivial.173 Although the issue can only
be resolved empirically, we concluded on balance that the ben-
efits of not enforcing penalty clauses-namely, avoiding oppor-
tunistic behavior-appear to exceed the costs. In the absence
of better empirical evidence, these costs appear to include only
forgoing the benefits of a few clauses designed to be overcom-
pensatory,174 and perhaps some increased litigation expenses.
A final criticism that might be asserted is that the liqui-
dated damage/penalty distinction is based upon paternalism
when no basis for paternalism exists. Kronman and Posner ar-
gue that if parties agree to a stipulated damages clause when
induced breach is possible, they will have considered this dan-
ger in negotiating the terms of the contract.175 If the contract
then is formed, benefits presumably exceed costs, including the
potential costs of the opportunistic behavior. They thus argue
that, however expensive those costs may be, if the contracting
parties bear all costs, how can the result be questioned?
The answer is at least two-fold. First, reducing the costs of
opportunism would release resources for other uses by lower-
ing the costs of exchange. Second, although it is true that
many parties would form contracts after weighing the costs of
opportunistic behavior, at the margin the added costs of oppor-
tunistic behavior would deter some bargains that would other-
wise be made. Some parties might choose alternatives such as
vertical integration that are more costly than contracting would
be if the law deterred opportunism. Thus, eliminating opportu-
nistic behavior not only lowers the costs of contracts that are
consummated, but also allows more exchanges to be made. Put
in more general economic terms: given existing constraints, the
resulting contractual arrangements will be optimal. Changes in
173. Id. at 368-72. The numerous examples of cases involving prevention
show that parties at least occasionally engage in opportunistic behavior of the
breach inducement variety. See notes 83-92 supra and accompanying text.
Before prevention was a well recognized doctrine, parties apparently openly
engaged in breach-inducement to obtain the benefits of stipulated damage
clauses. A well-known and graphic example is an early English case, Blandford
v. Andrews, 78 Eng. Rep. 930 (Q.B. 1599). In Andrews, the defendant had un-
dertaken to procure a marriage between the plaintiff and one Bridgette Palmer-
upon failure to procure the marriage the plaintiff was to receive £80. When the
plaintiff sued for the £80, defendant argued that the plaintiff had gone to Bridg-
ette, called her a whore, and warned that she would be tied to a post if he mar-
ried her. The plaintiff won, apparently because the defendant did not engage in
a maximum effort to convince Bridgette nevertheless to proceed with the mar-
riage.
174. Clauses entered into for speculation are one example of such over-
compensatory clauses. See note 171 supra.
175. See A. KRoNmAN & R. PosNwu, supra note 166, at 224-25.
[Vol. 65:521
OPPORTUNISM
constraints, however, typically result in a different optimal set
of arrangements. Measured by their transaction costs, one set
may be preferable to the other. In short, that the parties
choose to stipulate damages under one set of constraints does
not preclude the relative efficiency of a different set of con-
straints: namely, one in which not all such clauses are en-
forced.17 6
Kronman and Posner also imply that parties could avoid
the problem of induced breach simply by including clauses spe-
cifically preventing opportunism. Listing all types of induced
breach, however, would raise the costs of the contract. Al-
though the parties could agree to a more general clause against
penalties when an induced breach could occur, a court would
probably have difficulty interpreting such a clause. Because
the parties would then need to agree to a general definition or
to the precise circumstances that the term covers, such agree-
ments would require costly negotiation. Moreover, even if such
additional agreement over the term's meaning were unneces-
sary, the term would be more costly than an implicit term be-
cause it would force the parties to bargain over it. Indeed, the
argument that parties can always draft a clause to avoid poten-
tial problems proves too much because it can apply to any doc-
trine of contract law that is claimed to reduce transaction costs.
It is always more costly for contract law to adopt rules that
force additional negotiations. At some stage the law would con-
tain so many cost-increasing principles that costs of correcting
the law through contract would deter some exchanges.177
Nevertheless, the paternalism argument may have force for
another reason. Although "penalties" in current cases do not
appear to involve planned and intended overcompensation as
of the time of the contract, our analysis necessarily implies
only that an implicit term limiting the problems of opportunism
is desirable. The law, however, takes the additional step of
prohibiting parties from drafting around the distinction be-
tween liquidated damages and penalties. There is no reason in
theory to prevent contracting around the distinction, but there
are practical problems. For one, it is not sufficient simply to en-
force all stipulated damage clauses, because this increases the
costs of stipulated damage clauses when opportunism is a po-
176. See generally Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L & ECON. 141,
150-56 (1979).
177. See A. KRoNmAN & R. PosNFR, supra note 131, at 225. See also the dis-
cussion of this issue in Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 9, at 371 n.61.
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tential problem without producing compensating benefits.17 8
Alternatively, parties could state whether they wished the nor-
mal liquidated damage/penalty distinction to apply. It is not
surprising that this alternative has not been adopted, however,
given that contracts have termed the clause a "penalty" when
the parties have intended the clause to be compensatory, that
the distinction between liquidated damages and penalties has
caused confusion, and that few justifications exist for parties to
ignore the current rule.
A third alternative would be to separate the classes of
cases in which a penalty was mutually beneficial at the time
the contract was formed from those in which it was not, and to
enforce only the mutually beneficial ones. If the new entrant
problem were significant, for example, this would be a viable le-
gal solution. In fact, if a penalty is defined as a noncompensa-
tory stipulated damage clause-a definition that is close to one
used in the reasoning if not always in the results of many
cases-this alternative has been used to some extent, the best
examples being those cases involving limits on damages. Al-
though not compensatory, such limits have many beneficial
uses, create no incentive for opportunistic behavior,7 9 and
have been freely enforced by courts.180
In any event, failure to allow penalties may well be insig-
nificant. If few cases exist in which individuals desire to con-
tract around the current law, then the costs of "paternalism"
appear small. Some beneficial contracts might still be denied
enforcement, for example when one party desires to speculate
on breach or when the courts mistakenly apply the law. De-
spite these costs, the benefits of deterring opportunism provide
support for the law's current position.
178. This is discussed at length in Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 9, at
366-78. The statement assumes that the three objections raised earlier in this
part are invalid.
179. Id. at 367-69.
180. Id. at 384. Arbitration could be another device for drafting around the
distinction, although the courts are split upon enforcement of penalties in arbi-
tration. Compare Associated Gen. Contractors v. Savin Bros., 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335
N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975) (penalty enforced because policy against
penalties is not sufficient to outweigh policy favoring arbitration) with Garrity
v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976) (under
no circumstances can an arbitrator award punitive damages). See alo Note,
Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL
L. REv. 272 (1978).
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IV. CONCLUSION
When parties contract, the terms they choose may expose
one or both of them to opportunism. To avoid becoming vic-
tims, they will expend resources. This Article has analyzed the
role of contract and commercial law in minimizing these ex-
penditures and has reached three conclusions. First, when
viewed as responses to opportunism, many aspects of the law
previously regarded as diverse in nature should be recognized
as containing a common unifying principle. Second, courts
should employ the opportunism principle within particular doc-
trines of the law, thereby providing more coherence to these
rules than is now thought to exist. Recognition that deterring
opportunism provides a basis for the doctrines discussed here,
and perhaps for many others as well,181 reduces the confusion
181. This Article does not attempt to analyze, or even to list, all aspects of
contract law in which opportunism may be possible in the underlying transac-
tion. In particular, many forfeitures may occur at the inducement of the party
receiving the benefit of the forfeiture, see, e.g., discussion of the penalties at
notes 158-80 supra and accompanying text. Restitution is one principle often
used to police forfeiture; deterring opportunism may be relevant to the princi-
ples of restitution. A specific, and well known, example in which a court used
restitution to avoid a forfeiture is Britton v. Turner, 6 N.IL 481 (1834). In Tur-
ner, an employee with a one year contract left work two and one-half months
before the end of the term. The court awarded salary for the work performed
on a quasi-contractual theory. Given the possibility of employers inducing
breach near the end of the employment term, and thereby attempting to obtain
the benefits of the work to that time without paying for them, opportunism can
be relevant to understanding the transaction.
Another doctrine of contract law that can deter opportunism is specific per-
formance. One function of specific performance is to provide a remedy in situa-
tions in which a breach would occur without the threat of legal consequences.
In this sense, specific performance deters opportunism just as does making
promises legally enforceable. See note 19 supra.
At least three sections of Article 2 of the U.C.C. that we have yet to discuss
can also prevent opportunism. Under U.C.C. § 2-609, each party to a sales con-
tract has a duty not to impair the other's expectation of receiving performance.
When a party has reasonable grounds for being insecure, it can suspend its
performance, demand adequate assurances of performance, and, if assurances
are inadequate, declare an anticipatory breach. A party can act opportunisti-
cally by unreasonably declaring the assurances inadequate, and thus take ad-
vantage of a shift in market price in its favor. As do at least some common law
courts, the U.C.C. appears to police this possibility with a good faith require-
ment. See Summers, supra note 81, at 248-49. Second, under U.C.C. § 2-311(1),
a contract can leave the particulars of performance to be specified by one of the
parties. This raises the possibility of opportunism, to which the Code provides
that specifications must be in good faith and within limits set by commercial
reasonableness. Third, U.C.C. § 2-207 repeals the common-law "mirror-image"
rule of offer and acceptance that allowed a party to declare a contract not bind-
ing when months after it had been negotiated a price shift made the contract
unfavorable. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110
N.E. 619 (1915).
Finally, dispute settlement, a topic similar to contractual modification,
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and uncertainty that permeate many areas of contract law.
Finally, and more tentatively, the discussion suggests that
judges have in fact formulated principles to reduce the cost of
opportunism. This conclusion is tentative because empirical
evidence is inadequate; the contention that the legal principles
analyzed actually lower transaction costs rests in part upon in-
tuitive estimates of the costs involved. Empirical evidence
might modify some of the conclusions. Moreover, in some of
the areas discussed, the range of judicial opinion encompasses
thousands of cases and has not been fully analyzed. As a re-
sult, the nuances of some areas (good faith, for example) were
not considered; in other areas, such as nonconforming tenders,
secondary sources helped form the basis for the conclusion
that many decisions effectively lower costs. Even with these
qualifications, the analysis presented in this Article provides
strong evidence that judges can, and often do, act to lower im-
portant costs of transacting.
raises the possibility of opportunism. Courts police settlements for honesty in
the belief of the dispute, and thus may deter opportunism. See note 29 supra.
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